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CHAPTER I 
THE NAACP COMES TO ST. LOUIS 
St. Louis has always had a Negro minority. In 1764, 
gens de couleur helped found the city, and since that time 
they have had considerable importance in its history. 
During this century, black St. Louisans formed many 
organizations to achieve their goals. Perhaps the most 
significant was the St. Louis branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The 
St. Louis branch was prominent both locally and nation­
ally in the NAACP*s struggle to obtain first class citizen­
ship for Negroes. 
This study is the first made of the St. Louis NAACP 
branch. It covers the first forty years of the branch's 
history starting in 1914 with the inception of the branch 
and ending with a chapter on the post World War II period. 
Throughout the study, special emphasis is given to the 
branch's leadership and the effect the branch had on 
St. Louis, Missouri and the nation. 
1 
2 
Although issues and leaders changed, two continuing 
characteristics were evident from the start. Heated con­
flicts within the branch were numerous. Individuals dif­
fered as to the best solution to the problem facing the 
Negro. These differences of opinion often led to deep 
divisions within the branch. During periods of strong 
leadership when the conflicts were kept to a minimum, the 
branch made its most notable contributions. 
The second trait was the important influence exerted 
upon the branch by outsiders. The guidance which came 
from the national headquarters cannot be overemphasized. 
In every era, the actions of the branch (or its inaction) 
was often the direct result of stimulation from New York. 
Equally important was the fact that almost all the branch 
presidents were not native St. Louisans. The presidents 
brought new ideas, aggressive tempers, and, in some cases, 
inspired leadership to the St. Louis NAACP branch. These 
influences, originally foreign to St. Louis, helped make 
the branch one of the most important in the country. 
Five years before the founding of the St. Louis 
branch, a group of white liberals led by Mary White 
Ovington conceived the idea of an organization which was 
3 
later called the NAACP. In their view, the Negro had 
grown in wealth and education since the Civil War, but 
"...at the beginning of this century, his position as a 
citizen in the Republic was nearly hopeless."1 The race 
riot in Springfield, Illinois the previous year caused 
the liberals to act upon their conviction that race rela­
tions were regressing. They hoped to reverse this pro­
cess by establishing the new Association. 
The white liberals were joined by several Negroes led 
by W. E. B. DuBois. He rejected the leadership of Booker 
T. Washington who emphasized vocational training for 
Negroes while tacitly accepting second-class citizenship 
for his race. DuBois felt that the constitutional rights 
of Negroes were of prime importance, and therefore, he 
and some other dissatisfied Negroes joined together to 
form the "Niagara Movement." The NAACP absorbed this 
organization, and DuBois took the position as editor of 
the Association's official magazine. The Crisis. 
1Mary White Ovington, "The National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People," journal of Negro 
History, IX (April, 1924), 107. 
4 
During those first years, the leaders of the NAACP 
devoted much energy to increasing the size of their organi­
zation, In 1912, there were but 10 branches in the coun­
try. Two years later, there were 54, and by 1920, there 
2 
were about 400 NAACP branches. The growth was due,in 
part,to the efforts of Joel E. Spingarn, a white liberal 
who was considered a "firebrand" even by some leaders of 
the NAACP. After he was elected chairman of the execu­
tive board for 1914, he made two western trips at his own 
4 expense, and on his agenda was a visit to St. Louis. 
He came to St. Louis as a result of an invitation 
from the City Club of St. Louis, an organization of 
civic, business, and professional leaders. Two members 
of the club, Roger N. Baldwin and Gustavus A. Tuckerman, 
had strong liberal beliefs and both men held numerous 
offices in the City Club. Tuckerman's position as Civic 
2Ibid.. 115. 
Charles Flint Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. 
1909-20, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), I, 98. 
Oswald Garrison Villard labeled Spingarn a "firebrand." 
4Ibld., 128. 
5 
Secretary and his membership on the Public Affairs Com­
mittee, which arranged for speakers, enabled him to make 
5 the invitation to Spingarn. 
Rev. John W. Day introduced ..pingarn January 19, 1914 
at the City Club of St. Louis Luncheon. Spingarn*s speech 
was entitled "The Colored Citizen and His Future."6 Later 
he recalled that 
...as I spoke, first one person after another 
left the room in order to show their unmistakable 
disapproval, until when I finished only about one-
fourth of the audience remained.7 
Many white St. Louisans also believed him to be a "fire­
brand" as his reception at the luncheon indicated. 
That night Spingarn spoke at St. Paul's Church on 
Leffingwell Street. His reception by the Negro audience 
"...was enough to make him forget the humiliation of that 
O 
afternoon." He reviewed what had happened at the City 
Club luncheon and encouraged those at the meeting to form 
a NAACP branch in St. Louis. This advice was taken, and 
5City Club of St. Louis, Yearbook, (April, 1914), 
pp. 2-4; Letter, Roger N. Baldwin to Daniel T. Kelleher, 
September 25, 1968. 
^Gustavus A. Tuckerman, ed., City Club Bulletin, IV 
(February, 1914), 2. 
7St. Louis Argus, June 28, 1935. 
8Ibid. 
6 
temporary officers were elected the same night. Rev. W. 
Sampson Brooks of St. Paul's Church was elected president; 
Victoria Clay Haley was elected secretary; and Rev. B. G. 
9 
Shaw was elected treasurer. 
Spingarn was scheduled to depart the next day, but 
before leaving he wanted to establish a permanent organi­
zation. A meeting was held for that purpose at Union Mem­
orial Church at Pine and Leffingwell Streets on the morn­
ing of the 20th. Upon Spingarn*s recommendation, a white 
man, Gustavus A. Tuckerman, was elected president."'"0 
Spingarn explained that the most successful branches had 
white presidents. They were to execute the programs ini­
tiated by the board of directors. The board was to be 
mixed—black and white—but the chairman, Spingarn pointed 
out, should be a Negro. Thomas A. Curtis was elected Vice 
President and chairman of the board, Maude Tanter took the 
position of secretary, and Albert Burgess was the first 
^Edward A. McKinney, personal interviews with author 
held at 4038 Page, St. Louis, Mo., May 28, 1968 and Aug­
ust 5, 1968. 
' Ibid.; Letter, Baldwin to Kelleher, September 25, 
1968. Tuckerman was a clergyman originally from Boston. 
Prior to the formation of the NAACP in St. Louis, he had 
served on the Committee on Interracial Relations. 
7 
treasurer. All of the officers were Negroes except the 
president and a few of the board members.^ 
The first internal conflict of the St. Louis NAACP 
began on the 20th when Rev. W. Sampson Brooks and Rev. B. 
G. Shaw, both temporary officers, were displaced in favor 
of new officers. Both men resented the action, and since 
they controlled large congregations, their lack of cooper-
12 ation was felt by the branch during membership drives. 
The St. Louis branch grew despite the antagonism of 
Rev. Brooks and Rev. Shaw. By 1918, membership climbed 
1 1 to about 1,000. Many factors contributed to this growth. 
Most important were the issues confronting the black com­
munity which demonstrated the need for such an organiza­
tion and rallied support to the branch. Joseph E. Mitchell, 
the managing editor of the St. Louis Arcrus, gave it enthu­
siastic support. Much of his newspaper's front page space 
was devoted to the Association's membership drives in those 
1^McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5, 
1968; McKinney pointed out Maude Tanter died shortly after 
taking office, and Mrs. Helen Burrell Smith replaced her? 
Julia Davis, "Down Memory Lane," Unpublished, Typed, p. 38. 
St. Louis Public Library, Davis Collection. Davis credits 
Mrs. Smith as being the first secretary. 
"^McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968? August 5, 1968. 
13 St. Louis Argus, September 13, 1918. 
3 
early years. The publicity enabled the new Association to 
reach large segments of the Negro population. The branch 
devised incentives to increase membership. Recruitment 
teams were told that the team obtaining the largest number 
of paid members could elect the delegates to the national 
convention. In 1917 the St. Louis Argus charged that the 
14 branch did not carry through on its promise. 
The branch's meetings in the first few years were 
conducted at various churches and the public library. At 
first gatherings were held in large churches. Later the 
meetings were held in small churches because the leaders 
of the large churches, finding they could not dominate 
15 the Association lost interest. 
Although there might have been conflict between the 
Urban League and the NAACP in some cities, there is little 
to support the view of Miss Child Nerney of the NAACP's 
National Board of Directors that the Urban League was 
strong in St. Louis and used its strength to keep the 
NAACP from getting a foothold. Roger N. Baldwin was an 
^•4St. Louis Argus, December 21, 1917. 
15McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968. 
9 
important member of the Urban League, and he expressed a 
hope that a branch NAACP would be established in St. 
Louis.Rev. John W. Day introduced Joel Spingarn at 
the City Club luncheon and was the president of the NAACP 
branch from 1917 to 1924. During this same period. Rev. 
Day was the first vice-president of the Urban League, and 
17 • he served on its executive committee. T. A. Curtis, a 
prominent leader in the local NAACP, had a brother, W. P. 
18 
Curtis, who was on the board of the Urban League. The 
interlocking character of the leadership of these groups, 
facilitated cooperation rather than conflict. 
The activities of the St. Louis branch kept the mem­
bership busy during those early years. According to The 
Crisis .the local NAACP investigated rumors of segregation 
•^Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 128. Miss Ner-
ney gave two reasons why the Urban League opposed the for­
mation of a NAACP branch in St. Louis. Roger N. Baldwin, 
a leader of the white community and Urban League, was 
thought to be too conservative, and she felt the Urban Lea­
gue leaders feared the new Association would weaken their 
own organization. 
17 Harvey Lawrence Boxerman, "St. Louis Urban Leagues 
History and Activities" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
St. Louis University, 1968), pp. 27, 29. 
l8Ibid., 29; Dr. L. Simmington Curtis. Personal in­
terview with author held 5857 Waterman, St. Louis, Mo., 
August 6, 1968. 
10 
in the post office, during the summer of 1914, but the 
19 rumors proved "...without much foundation." This was 
the first time the St. Louis branch was mentioned in the 
NAACP's magazine. 
During the winter of 1914-15, the branch started a 
campaign to end segregated seating at the free symphony. 
Representatives of the branch asked the President of the 
Symphony, James E. Smith, to incorporate equal seating 
privileges for all, but the request was denied. The 
branch then printed cards telling of the segregated seat­
ing of Negroes and passed them out at the entrance. The 
20 results were meager; large numbers went in anyway. 
The NAACP initiated a battle against the showing of 
the film "The Birth of a Nation" in 1915. Many branches 
followed the national's lead, and "their hectoring had 
21 considerable nuisance value." The film had many objec­
tionable features including the portrayal of Ku Klux Klan 
members as noble humane youths defending white maidens in 
19The Crisis. VIII (September, 1914), 237. 
2QSt. Louis Argus. January 1, 1915. 
^Mary White Ovington, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 
(New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1947), pp. 129-130. 
11 
peril and of Negroes as peanut-eating clowns. The St. 
Louis branch evidently had some powerful friends in City 
Hall, for the city authorities issued an order forbidding 
the showing of the film. It was finally shown in St. 
Louis after the producers of the film secured an injunc-
22 tion against the order. The battle against the movie 
continued without success. As late as 1921 a committee 
from the branch asked Mayor Kiel to forbid the showing of 
the film. The Mayor declined, stating he did not have the 
23 necessary power. 
In sum, the founding of the St. Louis NAACP reveals 
two traits which were of paramount importance throughout 
its history. In 1914 an outsider encouraged the city's 
black minority to organize an NAACP branch. Outside stim­
ulation leading to action was established early as a prime 
characteristic of the branch. Crippling internal conflicts 
also appeared early as a branch trait. The replacement of 
temporary officers in favor of permanent ones created ill 
22The Crisis, XI (November, 1915), 36. 
"st. Louis Argus, September 23, 1921. 
12 
will, but the branch survived this cleavage as it did the 
many that followed. 
Some of the conditions which induced the founding of 
the NAACP were also evident during the formation of the 
St. Louis branch. White liberals started the Association 
after the Springfield riot of 1908, and it absorbed the 
black group known as the "Niagara Movement." This pro­
cess was duplicated in St. Louis to the extent that a seg­
ment of the Negro leadership joined a few white liberals 
to form the St. Louis NAACP branch. The early efforts of 
the new Association oiten proved unsuccessful as demon­
strated by the fight against the showing of the film, 
"The Birth of a Nation," The membership list grew, how­
ever, which indicated that many St. Louisans saw the need 
for a NAACP branch. The branch justified the confidence 
placed in it with many achievements in the years that 
followed. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION ORDINANCE OF 1916 
Segregation was not new to the black St. Louisan of 
sixty or seventy years ago. Before the end of the Recon­
struction Era, St. Louis schools for whites and blacks 
had been separated by statute. During the first twenty 
years of this century, there were intensive efforts to 
extend the areas covered by segregation laws. 
At the same time St. Louisans demanded progressive 
reforms in order to make the city government more democra­
tic. It was argued that public issues should be decided 
by the electorate and therefore the initiative which al­
lowed the public to initiate and vote on issues was in­
cluded in the St. Louis City Charter of 1914. Two years 
later, St. Louis became the first city in the country 
where the people voted directly into law the mandatory 
residential segregation of Negroes and whites.3" 
^Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only* The Supreme Court, 
the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant cases. (Berkeley: 
University of California press, 1949), p. 51. 
13 
14 
The idea of statutory residential segregation was not 
original with St. Louis. After Baltimore passed its law 
in 1910, many cities followed suit: Winston-Salem in 1910? 
Birmingham, Alabama, and Richmond, Virginia in 1913? and 
Louisville, Kentucky, in 1914. A host of other border and 
southern cities had passed residential segregation laws by 
1916, and it appeared that such laws would become more nu-
2 
merous throughout the country. 
In St. Louis the neighborhood improvement associations 
provided most of the impetus for a "Baltimore Law." Most 
of the associations were located on the periphery of the 
Negro community. These associations, which included the 
home owners of certain streets, used their organizations 
to promote what they considered to be the civic welfare 
of their own areas. Much of their effort was devoted to 
keeping neighborhood housing values high. They assumed 
that excluding Negroes from their neighborhoods would en­
hance property values. Keeping a neighborhood white was 
viewed in the same light as protection against a natural 
calamity. According to the United Welfare Association 
2The Crisis, XV (December, 1917), 69. 
15 
"...Negro invasion.../_ was__/.. .a danger.. .greater even 
than fire, or flood, or tornado—far greater."^ it was 
not only logical they believed, but necessary that the 
city government pass a law which would forestall this 
danger. 
Soon after Baltimore enacted its law, the neighbor­
hood associations of St. Louis started advocating a sim­
ilar law.4 They had little success with the city authori­
ties, but they built an effective organization and gained 
some powerful allies. The United Welfare Association pro­
vided the bond that held together and gave leadership to 
the forces which were working for residential segregation. 
Delegates from various neighborhood improvement associa­
tions made the policies of the United Welfare Association. 
The Association's most powerful ally was the Real Estate 
Exchange. The realtors lent valuable assistence to the 
Association. In its appeals for financial help, the 
Association assured its contributors the money would be 
3 
Letter, Felix P. Lawrence, President United Welfare 
Association to St. Louis Public Library, N.d., St. Louis 
Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File. 
4St. Louis Post-Dispatch. December 18, 1911. 
16 
used wisely because "the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange 
guarantee/d_/ the honest expenditure of every dollar ab­
solutely. "5 
The United Welfare Association increased its activi­
ties after the new city charter of 1914 adopted the ini­
tiative. A proposed law could be placed on the ballot if 
10% of the registered voters signed a petition. The Assoc­
iation started circulating a petition in the summer of 
1915 for the purpose of obtaining 
an ordinance to prevent ill feeling, conflict and 
collision between the white and colored races in 
the city of St. Louis and to preserve the public 
peace and promote the general welfare by making 
reasonable provisions requiring the use of sepa­
rate blocks for residence by white and colored 
respectively.° 
The other parts of the law included the same racial res­
trictions on public places such as churches, schools, and 
dance halls. The law specifically exempted domestic ser-
7 vants who resided in their employer's buildings. 
5 Letter, Felix P. Lawrence to St. Louis Public 
Library. N.d., St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. 
Louis—Segregation File. 
^Residential Segregation Ordinance of St. Louis (copy), 




The literature of the segregationists maintained that 
if personal encounters between races could be kept at a 
minimum, the chance of a race riot would be lessened, and 
that science proved race mixing biologically harmful. The 
basic appeal, however, was economic. The law was to stop 
real or threatened influx of Negroes who caused "handsome 
8 neighborhoods" to go to ruin. In particular, it was 
pointed out that the small home owner had the most to lose, 
g 
and the ordinance would preclude any possibility of loss. 
The segregationists assured the voters that such a law was 
not undemocratic or un-American, for all good laws ". . . seek 
to bestow the greatest good upon the greatest number."^® 
Prejudice was disclaimed as a motive, and Abraham Lincoln 
was quoted regarding the benefits of segregation.11 The 
public statements of the United Welfare Association were 
8Chilton Atkinson, "Observations on the Segregation 
Ordinance," Speech delivered at St. Alphonsus Parish Hall, 
St. Louis, February 6, 1916, p. 5, pamphlet, St. Louis 
Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File. 
9Letter, J. L. Barngrove, Realtor to the Editor. 
St. Louis Republic. February 29, 1916. 
*°Atkinson, "Observations on the Segregation Ordi­
nance, " p. 2, St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. 
Louis—Segregation File. 
11Ibid.. p. 6. 
18 
not based on blatant appeals to prejudice. Racial harmony 
and economic advantage were the primary points of emphasis. 
In order to obtain an audience for these views, the 
United Welfare Association used the film "The Birth of a 
Nation" advantageously. The film graphically portrayed 
the chief desire of Negroes as being lust for white women. 
As the audience filed out, they were confronted by repre­
sentatives of the United Welfare Association distributing 
12 propaganda and asking for signatures to their petition. 
The Association mailed letters asking for support and 
financial contributions. The letters included a small leaf­
let entitled, "Do You Realize This Danger—Your Danger?" 
The leaflet listed the names and addresses of persons re­
presenting about 1,000 people who claimed to have lost 
from $250 to $12,000 because of Negro invasions into their 
13 neighborhoods. Such methods and arguments were success­
ful, and early in December, 1915, the petition was pre­
sented to the city officials. The price of $73,285 was 
I2The Crisis. XI (November, 1915), 36; XI, (January, 
1916), 140. 
^United Welfare Association. "Do You Realize This 
Danger—Your Danger?" (N.d.), leaflet, St. Louis Public 
Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation File. 
19 
affixed by the Board of Election Commissioners as the 
cost for the special election to be held February 29, 
1916.14 
The opponents of the residential segregation law 
were equally active. As early as 1911, the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch characterized such a law as "fatuous and 
15 futile." In 1913, "The Committee on Housing of Negroes" 
published a six-page report. The report argued against 
the "Baltimore Law" that was pending in the Municipal 
Assembly of St. Louis, in the Committee's opinion, the 
race problem could not "...be solved by crystalizing pre­
judice into legislation."16 By the spring of 1915, a com­
mittee of fifteen whites and fifteen Negroes was waging 
an extensive campaign against the attempt to pass the 
segregation ordinance. One white leader of the committee, 
Roger N. Baldwin, prepared a pamphlet for publication and 
14St. Louis Republic. December 11, 1915. 
15St. Louis post-Dispatch, December 18, 1911. 
16 The Committee on Housing of Negroes. "The Legal 
Segregation of Negroes in Saint Louis," January, 1913, 
leaflet, St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis— 
Segregation File. 
20 
distribution.*"^ The local NAACP pressured candidates for 
the Board of Alderman to take a stand on the segregation 
18 
ordinance. Many of the aldermen came out against it. 
These early efforts were successful, and the United Wel­
fare Association was forced to circumvent the city govern­
ment and resort to the initiative. 
Until the fall of 1915, the battle was fought between 
St. Louisans with much of the effort against the proposed 
law falling upon the white leaders of the community. In­
deed, the masses of Negroes in St. Louis were suprisingly 
indifferent. They were already segregated, and they 
19 
reasoned passing a law would make little difference. 
The Negro leaders were concerned, and the NAACP branch 
continued its activities. When it appeared that the law's 
advocates were making great strides with the initiative, 
the NAACP decided to help its St. Louis branch. 
•*-7The Crisis. X (May, 1915), 39; Letter, Roger N. 
Baldwin to Daniel Kelleher, September 25, 1968. Baldwin 
organized the groups opposed to the ordinance. 
*"8St. Louis Argus. April 9, 1915; The Crisis. XI 
(March, 1916), 260. 
19The Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 240. 
21 
The NAACP sent Miss Kathryn M. Johnson, one of its 
field workers, to St. Louis. She took charge of the head­
quarters set up in the Knights of Pythias Hall which was 
lent by that Negro fraternal group. She received help at 
the headquarters from Mrs. Helen A. Smith, the secretary 
of the branch? Miss Helen Spears, the stenographer and 
clerk in charge of the headquarters; and a solicitor in 
20 charge of auditing all accounts. 
Once the initiative petition started circulating, the 
battle revolved around campaigns to reach as many people 
as possible. During September, Kathryn Johnson reached 
an estimated 5,000 people by addressing groups in churches, 
schools, and theatres. A house-to-house canvass was plan­
ned for October. Miss Johnson also helped organize public 
meetings. One such meeting was held at the Central Bap­
tist Church, and the speakers included Congressman L. C. 
Dyer of St. Louis, Miss Child Nerney of the NAACP's na­
tional office, and clergyman B. G. Shaw. The Negro com­
munity appreciated Kathryn Johnson's "valuable assist-
21 ance." 
20Ibid.. XI (January, 1916), 140-141. 
21 
Ibid., XI (November, 1915), 36? St. Louis Argus. 
October 29, 1915; March 3, 1916. 
22 
The national office provided help, but St. Louisans 
did most of the work. Local Negro NAACP leaders chair-
raaned the various committees in charge of publicity, legal 
matters, and finances. Such leaders as Charles Pitman, 
Thomas A. Curtis, Homer G. Phillips, and George L. Vaughn 
22 played prominent roles. The chairman of the branch 
executive committee, Charles Pitman, was indispensable. 
23 
He was a "bright" Negro, and could go to meetings from 
which Negroes were excluded. This enabled the NAACP to 
keep abreast of what the opposition was doing. Pitman 
was a realtor, and he spent his own money to keep the 
fight going. One observer remarked that Pitman spent at 
least some time every day at the headquarters while the 
fight continued.24 
Opponents of the "Baltimore Law" published and dis­
tributed volumes of propaganda. Negro girls and women 
22St. Louis Argus. August 6, 1915. 
2*» 
Curtxr interview, August 6, 1968. This term in the 
black community denotes one having a very light complexion. 
Curtis said Pitman could and did pass easily for a white. 
24McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5, 
1968. 
23 
passed out circulars on the streets bearing a cartoon de­
picting a white man lashing a Negro with the caption 
"Back to slavery."25 Anti-segregationist literature in­
cluded "Negro Segregation—A Measure to Assassinate a 
26 
Race" by George E. Stevens. A brochure entitled "A 
Shaming Stigma Upon St. Louis" used a Fitzpatrick car­
toon from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The cartoon was 
named "The Great Divide," and it pictured the black and 
white communities glaring at each other over an alley. 
The reader was informed that "Segregation would create 
27 moral slavery," and was not in the American tradition 
of fair play. Another piece of literature, a one page 
cardboard leaflet, reported that the segregation law was 
unconstitutional, un-Christian, and "...nefarious, hideous, 
dangerous, and un-American and calculated to undermine our 
25"Negro Segregation in St. Louis," Literary Digest. 
LII, (March 18, 1916), 702. 
2^fhe Crisis. XI (November, 1915), 36. 
"st. Louis Branch NAACP, "A Shaming Stigma Upon St. 
Louis Would Be Race Segregation by Law," (N.d.), Leaflet, 
St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segrega­
tion File. 
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civilization and the principles of democracy upon which 
28 
it is founded." The NAACP did not hesitate to enter 
vigorously into the battle of words, and by December over 
20,000 pieces of literature had been sent out from the 
29 branch headquarters. 
In December, 1915, the forces opposing the proposed 
law had a moment of optimism, for it looked as if the 
money for the election might not be appropriated. The 
Board of Aldermen asked the City Counselor to submit an 
opinion on the constitutionality of the initiative clause 
in the new charter, and then adjourned for two weeks. 
After Christmas the fight was on again. 
Even before the city counselor reported back to the 
Board of Aldermen, there was some talk of testing the 
constitutionality of the initiative in the courts. Based 
on "...the best legal opinions in Missouri and /_ the 
28 
St. Louis Branch NAACP, "Reasons Why Residential 
Segregation Should Be Defeated," (N.d.), Leaflet, St. 
Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. Louis—Segregation 
File. 
2^St. Louis Argus, December 17, 1915. 
3Qst. Louis Republic, December 17, 1915y The Crisis, 
XI (February, 1916), 194-195. 
25 
advice of_/ Mr. Story, Counsel for the National Associa-
31 
tion...M, the NAACP opposed this approach. So did the 
32 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Even so, some leaders in the 
Negro community announced their intention to test the 
33 initiative clause. This caused some conflict, and 
Kathryn Johnson, the NAACP's field agent in St. Louis 
wrote a public letter calling for unity.3<* The NAACP, 
through The Crisis, warned that "...the bourbons of St. 
Louis will have reason to congratulate themselves if the 
colored people split on this issue while the enemy as 
3C 
usual stands as one." Finally, the local NAACP agreed 
to take the case, but this did not stop the factionalism. 
The disagreement now centered on who would take the case 
and on what grounds. One group of Negro ministers wanted 
to hire some white lawyers and attack the proposed law on 
the grounds that the segregation ordinance might soon be 
3J-The Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141. 
3^St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 18, 1915. 
33The Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141. 
3^St. Louis Argus, December 17, 1915. 
35The Crisis. XI (January, 1916), 141. 
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declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The branch leaders wanted their legal 
staff to handle the case. The branch attorneys wanted 
to argue the position that the Constitution of Missouri 
did not permit the people of St. Louis to legislate by 
means of the initiative. Finally, the branch filed 
the case in court. Homer G. Phillips and George L. 
Vaughn, the branch's counsel, pleaded the case, and 
Charles Pitman, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, 
was the plaintiff. The money used for the suit could 
have been saved because mid-way through January, the 
37 court decided against Pitman. 
How badly the split over legal strategy hurt the 
opponents of the "Baltimore Law" is hard to ascertain. 
Certainly the wasted time, effort, and money did not 
further the cause. The NAACP consoled itself by explain­
ing the division in terms of the heritage of slavery 
38 
which had left the Negro an uncertain person. Splits 
36St. Louis Argus. December 17, 1915. 
37Ibid., January 21, 1916? The Crisis. XI (February, 
1916), 194-195. 
38The Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 240. 
27 
of this type were not unusual. Negroes in other cities 
similarly threatened also spent needed energy fighting 
39 
amongst themselves. 
By January, 1916, the opposing forces increased the 
pace of their campaign. The United Welfare Association 
favored passage as did the Real Estate Exchange which 
included almost all the real estate companies. On Janu­
ary 28, 1916, the Polish Americans of St. Louis held a 
40 special meeting and publicly endorsed the law. As the 
election came closer, the United Welfare Association por­
trayed it as a simple contest of White vs. Black. 
How can we afford to let the Negro whip the 
white man in this election. Shall such a report 
as that go out over the country... 
The Negroes have raised over $25,000 to de­
feat the white man in his fight for segregation 
and home protection. They have registered in the 
thousands, driving to the polls in style in limou­
sines. Hundreds if not thousands are reported to 
have been shipped in here from Memphis and the 
south to swell the Negro vote.... 
The forces in favor of the law were substantial, and the 
tone of their appeal while not outlandishly racist. 
3^Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 186. 
^St. Louis Republic, January 29, 1916. 
41Letter, Felix P. Lawrence to St. Louis Public Lib­
rary. N.D., St. Louis Public Library, Negroes in St. 
Louis—Segregation File. 
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certainly was calculated to appeal to the average white's 
inner prejudice. 
If the forces in favor were substantial, the forces 
against seemed almost overwhelming. Not only was the 
Negro community opposed, but also 23 of the 28 aldermen 
had declared themselves against such an ordinance.42 
L. C. Dyer, Republican congressmen from St. Louis worked 
against it, as did most of the Republican leadership of 
the city. State Senator Michael Kinney (Democrat) used 
his political organization to distribute handbills against 
43 
the proposed law. The Jewish Community and the Social­
ist Party openly opposed the passage of such a law.44 
Most of the political leadership of the city were against 
the residential segregation ordinance. 
42The Crisis. XI (March, 1916), 260. 
43McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968. 
^Merle Fainsod. "The Influence of Racial and Na­
tional Qroups in St. Louis Politics (1908-1928)." (Un­
published Masters "dissertation." Washington University, 
St. Louis, June, 1929), p. 59. On page 58, Fainsod mis­
takenly states that the Negro community was in favor of 
the new law. This is a rather important mistake in this 
comprehensive Master's work. 
29 
The newspapers were generally opposed to the law. 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch as early as 1911 expressed 
its opposition, and continued to carry this view before 
and after the election. The St. Louis Arcms was solidly 
opposed and devoted a great deal of space to the battle. 
The St. Louis Globe-Democrat also came out against the 
law, but basically the paper crowded its pages with other 
news. The St. Louis Republic editorialized briefly 
against the law, but generally most of the space on this 
topic was devoted to the pros and cons of the proposed 
law.45 
The NAACP made an attempt to gain the support of the 
Catholic Church. Kathryn Johnson went to Father McGuire 
to enlist his support. She asked him to persuade Arch­
bishop Glennon of St. Louis to come out publicly against 
the ordinance. Although Father McGuire was the pastor 
of St. Elizabeth, a Negro church, he declined Kathryn 
Johnson's request. She broke down in tears as Father 
McGuire stated he believed in the segregation of the 
races, cardinal Gibbons was asked to intervene, but he 
45St. Louis Republic, March 2, 1916. This issue 
gives a good summation of how the St. Louis newspapers 
stood on the controversy. 
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telegraxned back that Archbishop Glennon was supreme in 
his own diocese. He also advised the NAACP field worker 
to contact the Papal delegate in Washington, D. C. This 
was done, and Archbishop Glennon finally made the public 
statement desired by Miss Johnson. The pronouncement by 
the church leader came so late that it could not have 
made much difference, for few of the faithful were aware 
46 
of the church s stand. 
All concerned parties made eleventh hour efforts. 
The City Club of St. Louis held a debate four days be­
fore the election. One of the debaters, the Attorney for 
the City of Louisville, Kentucky, Pendleton C. Beckley, 
told the audience that the question was moral and not 
political. Why, he asked, could not the principle of 
segregation be applied to housing as it had been to 
schools and hotels? His opponent. Judge A. D. Nortoni, 
rested his argument on the supposition that the proposed 
law was unconstitutional. Walter McGinnis, Counsel for 
the Real Estate Exchange disputed this point, and 
46McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968. 
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publicly announced that the proposed law was "both lawful 
and wise.1,47 
The St. Louis Republic was informed by telephone that 
nine priests of the city had preached the previous Sunday 
against the segregation law. However, of the priests who 
AO 
could be reached, none confirmed the caller's claim. 
On the morning of the election, the Board of Election Com­
missioners was forced to issue supplementary instructions 
to the police working at the polling stations. This action 
was necessary because challengers were appearing at poll­
ing places with unauthorized credentials. Reportedly, the 
NAACP issued the credentials but the newspaper incorrectly 
called the Association, "the Society for the Advancement 
49 
of Colored People." 
47St. Louis Republic, February 17, 1916? February 26, 
1916. The Louisville Residential Segregation Law was be­
ing appealed at that time to the United States Supreme 
Court by the NAACP. 
48Ibid., February 29, 1916. 
49 St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 29, 1916. The 
credentials were signed by Gustavus Tuckerman, who was 
president of the local NAACP, Mrs. A. J. Smith, and the 
rubber stamp signature of John Schmoll, Chairman of the 
Republican City Committee. 
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On election day, the opponents of the segregation 
law hoped for a light turn out. Of the 140,010 registered 
voters eligible to vote, only 9,846 were black men. Both 
sides publicly expressed confidence, but privately those 
at the branch headquarters said the ordinance would win 
by a big majority. This prediction proved correct as the 
voters turned out in unusually large numbers for the 
special election. Only three of the city's twenty-eight 
wards were carried against the ordinance, and the final 
50 
vote was 52,220 in favor to 17,877 against. The white 
wards closest to Negro residential areas voted most heavily 
for the ordinance. The Republican leadership of the city 
who served as allies in the fight against the ordinance 
"...would not, dared not, or could not deliver their wards 
as they had promised."51 Only a Democrat, Mike Kinney, 
was able to carry his ward, and the Negro leadership 
5°St. Louis Republic. February 29, 1916; March 1, 
1916. There were two proposed laws. One made it illegal 
to invade a block if its residents were 100% of one race. 
The other was more stringent, for it lowered the percent 
to 75%. Both laws were passed and the most stringent one 
took effect. 
51Fainsod, "The Influence of Racial and National 
Groups in St. Louis Politics," pp. 58, 60. 
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pointed an accusing finger at the Republican leaders and 
52 cried "double-cross." The St. Louis Argus summed up 
the election results with the headline, "Prejudice Wins 
Election. 
The people had spoken. It was clear that the vast 
majority of St. Louisans wanted residential segregation 
formalized by law. The St. Louis Republic called on both 
sides to keep friction at a minimum and urged St. Louis 
Negroes to accept the new law and improve on what they 
had.54 
Charles Pitman, the Chairman of the St. Louis branch 
Executive Committee, was not willing to accept the will of 
the majority. He contacted Col. Wells Blodgett, chief 
counsel for the Wabash Railroad and an ex-officer in the 
Union Army, in the hope of taking the new law into the 
C C 
courts. On March 7, a meeting was held at Col. Blodgett's 
52St. Louis Republic, March 1, 1916. 
55St. Louis Argus, March 3, 1916. 
54St. Louis Republic, March 1, 1916. 
55McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968. 
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office where strategy was planned. A committee, includ­
ing the ex-Secretary of Interior Charles Nagel, Col. Blod-
gett, Percy Werner, Judge Selden P. Spencer, Joseph Wheless, 
and Judge Leo Rassieur prepared to file a suit, without 
charge to the NAACP, restraining the city officials from 
56 enforcing the new ordinance. Before the end of the 
month, the case was before the court, and by April, 1916, 
Judge D. P. Dyer had issued a temporary injunction enjoin­
ing the city from operating under the new segregation 
ordinance. This injunction was to remain in force until 
a similar case pending before the United States Supreme 
57 Court had been decided. 
On November 5, 1917, the Supreme Court decided unan­
imously that the Louisville residential segregation law 
CO 
was unconstitutional. Judge D. P. Dyer, who had issued 
58Ibid.; McKinney remembered that the local NAACP 
did pay $1.00 to Col. Blodgett; The Crisis, XII (May, 
1916), 37. 
57St. Louis Argus, March 24, 1916; April 21, 1916. 
Judge D. P. Dyer was related to Congressman L. C. Dyer 
who had worked aqainst the passage of the ordinance. 
L. C. Dyer later introduced an anti-lynch bill into Con­
gress. (See Chapter III.) The Dyer family had long been 
considered friends of the Negro. 
58Buchanan vs. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, November, 1917. 
35 
the temporary injunction said he would make this injunc­
tion permanent if asked to do so because both the St. Louis 
59 
law and the Louisville law involved the same principle. 
In March of the following year. Judge Dyer made permanent 
the temporary injunction issued over a year before.60 
The victory, while important, was nevertheless some­
what hollow. Private agreements (restrictive covenants) 
among property owners restricting the sale of their pro­
perty from Negroes achieved the objective fought for by 
the proponents of the residential segregation ordinance. 
These agreements had the force of a contract and were en­
forceable in the courts. In 1948, the highest court in 
the land would declare such covenants un-enforceable in 
the courts, and St. Louis would again play a central role 
in this fight of a generation later. 
59St. Louis Post-Dispatch. November 6, 1917. 
6;)St. Louis Arcrns. March 29, 1918. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EAST ST. LOUIS RACE RIOT AND THE ANTI-LYNCH 
CAMPAIGN—CAUSE AND EFFECT 
During the first hot days of July, 1917, the United 
States experienced its worst race riot of the century. 
According to one eye witness, the East St. Louis Riot was 
more than a race riot—it was a massacre. To the chant 
of "get a nigger...get another," mobs stopped street cars 
and pulled off, stoned, and clubbed blacks without regard 
to age or sex. White prostitutes grabbed the hair and 
clothing of fleeing Negro women, and then beat them about 
the face and breasts with sticks and stones. A group of 
Negro men attempted to submit to some white rioters but 
as they held their hands high, the rioters clubbed them 
with gun butts. As they lay on the street, young girls 
bloodied their stockings by kicking the limp bodies. The 
mob threatened ambulance drivers if they stopped to pick 
up wounded blacks. In one attempt to give a wounded 
Negro a proper southern death by lynching, the clothes­
line broke, but stronger rope was found. As Negroes fled 
36 
37 
from their burning houses, they were picked off like 
"running rabbits." One reporter saw the white East St. 
Louis mob throw a small black child into a blazing shack. 
When it was all over, 200 houses had been destroyed, and 
the estimates of those killed ranged from forty-seven to 
1 several hundred. 
The use of Negroes as strike breakers and a lax city 
government appear to have brought on the explosive situa­
tion. There had been some conflict between blacky and 
whites earlier that summer, and Govenor Lowden of Illinois 
had sent in the militia. The militia, according the 
St. Louis NAACP in a letter to Govenor Lowden, was "...dis­
criminating in favor of whites." This alleged discrimin­
ation took the form of disarming the Negro community while 
2 white citizens were allowed to keep their arms. 
In July, the hate in East St, Louis erupted and 
spilled forth destruction and death. While the rioting was 
-^St, Louis Post-Dispatch. July 3, 1917? Elliott M. 
Rudwick, Race Riot at East St, Louis, July 1917 (Carbon-
dales SIU Press, 1964), Chapter 5. 
2St. Louis Argus, June 1, 1917? June 8, 1917. 
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at its height, the St. Louis "National Association for 
the Advancement of Negroes" ̂  sic_/ called a meeting 
which 200 persons attended. At the meeting, the NAACP 
leadership made plans for helping the refugees coming in­
to St. Louis, and prepared appeals asking President Wil­
son and Govenor Lowden to take steps to stop the killing 
3 
in East St. Louis. The existing social organizations in 
St. Louis handled most of the relief for the East St. 
Louis refugees. Many were housed in a big warehov.se across 
from city hall. St. Louis Negroes, acting as individuals, 
4 
performed numerous other services for these refugees. 
As an organization, the local NAACP was primarily 
concerned with the legal work which developed as a result 
of the riot. The U.S. District Attorney of East St. Louis 
announced immediately following the riots, that under a 
new statute, the city of East St. Louis was liable up to 
3Ibid., July 6, 1917? St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
July 3, 1917. 
4McKinney Interviews, May 28, 1968 and August 5, 
1968. McKinney indicated the refugees were met and 
counseled as they crossed the bridge into St. Louis; 
Curtis Interview, August 6# 1968. Curtis went to East 
St. Louis while the riot continued in order to obtain 
the pay checks of some of the riot refugees. 
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5 
$5,000 for each person killed. William E. B. DuBois 
came to St. Louis to form a committee of St. Louisans to 
gather evidence and take testimony.6 in a public letter. 
Homer G. Phillips, speaking for the legal committee of 
the branch, told the victims of the riot that the NAACP 
stood ready to represent them without charge in any attempt 
to recover damages for their loss. Much of the branch's 
legal work concerned the collection of damages, and ulti­
mately the branch handled a large number of the nearly 
7 2,000 claims filed against the city of East St. Louis. 
To carry on this work, the branch immediately called 
for $2,000 in donations for a fund to support relief and 
Q 
legal action. By December, 1917, the Committee of che 
East St. Louis Refugee Defense Fund had raised over 
9 
$4,000, but in the collection and disbursement of the 
legal defense money, a schism developed within the Negro 
community. The controversy revolved around Dr. Leroy N. 
5St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1917. 
8St. Louis Argus, July 13, 1917. 
7 
Ibid.. August 3, 1917. 
8Ibid.. July 13, 1917. 
8Ibid.. December 21, 1917. 
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Bundy, an East St. Louis dentist and local political 
figure. He was one of several Negroes charged with in­
citing the riot.*-® Dr. Bundy became the scapegoat for 
the whites in their attempt to explain the riot as a 
Negro conspiracy. He also became a hero for a nation­
wide Negro audience. To raise legal defense money. 
Dr. Bundy accepted many speaking engagements around the 
country. He seemed to enjoy taking his case to the 
people. Being a national celebrity appealed to him 
m o r e  t h a n  m a k i n g  a  l i v i n g  a t  h i s  c h o s e n  t r a d e , a n d  
the temper of white East St. Louisans was such that 
Dr. Bundy was safer outside the city. 
From the speaking tours Dr. Bundy not only expected 
to raise money for the defense fund, but he also planned 
to pay his living expenses. This might have been pala­
table to the NAACP, which was handling his defense, but 
Bundy's refusal to make an account of what was collected 
was not acceptable to the Association. The feud first 
developed between Bundy and the branch's Executive 
^Several whites were also charged. 
•^Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, p. 122. 
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Committee led by Charles Pitman. By April, 1918, 
Dr. Bundy and the members of the branch's Executive 
12 Committee were not on speaking terms. The branch re­
fused to sanction his appeals for money. Bundy asked 
the branch leaders if the NAACP planned to furnish him 
enough money to support himself.^-3 Dissatisfied with 
the branch's answer that he should support himself with 
dentistry, he continued on his speaking tour. The St. 
Louis branch thereafter described his personal appear­
ances as "junkets."^4 
The St. Louis NAACP recommended to the national 
office that they withdraw from the case. The national 
was reluctant to follow the branch's recommendation and 
promptly called a meeting where Dr. Bundy was to present 
his side of the story. The meeting was a fiasco, and 
the national came to the same conclusion as the St. 
Louis branch because 
His (Bundy*s) demeanor throughout the hear­
ing impressed the committee as lacking in frank­
ness and was characterized by an apparently 
12Ibid.. pp. 122-123. 
13The Crisis, XVI (September, 1918), 225. 
14Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, pp. 122-123. 
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strong desire to avoid disclosing the real facts 
in the situation to the committee.^ 
The national asked its followers to stop contributing 
money to Bundy because the Association could not strictly 
account for collections and expenditures. In order to pre­
vent scandal, the NAACP never sponsored individuals who 
16 took unaudited money. 
Dr. Bundy was not without friends. Attorney Homer G. 
Phillips, a leader in the St. Louis Negro community and the 
local NAACP, continued to serve as one of Bundy's counsel. 
Other St. Louisans were displeased with the NAACP's deci­
sion to drop the case. On the front page of the St. Louis 
Argus. a letter condemned the NAACP for withdrawing. The 
letter pointed out that the Bundy case was a cause to which 
all black men should rally. It was signed by a long list 
17 
of people including many prominent Negro clergymen. Per­
haps it was a cause behind which all Negroes should have 
united, but the NAACP's fear of scandal and loss of con­
trol over the funds became the overriding factor in its 
decision to resign from the Bundy Case. 
•*-5The Crisis. XVI (September, 1918), 224. 
"^Ibid.. pp. 225. 
^St. Louis Argus, September 27, 1918. 
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The East St. Louis Riot undoubtedly caused fears and 
apprehensions in the white community# but within the Negro 
community and parts of the white leadership the riot 
served as a first-hand reminder of the Negro's tenuous 
position in the American society. New efforts were made 
to improve his position including the new vigor given 
the NAACP anti-lynching campaign. 
The NAACP started the anti-lynch campaign in 1911. 
The original plan was to investigate# educate# and to 
bring pressure to bear on public officials to punish 
mobs.1Q The branch was active early in this campaign.19 
After the East St. Louis Riot, the campaign was expanded 
to include the demand for state and federal laws to pre­
vent mob action. 
Congressman Leondias C. Dyer launched these efforts 
on the national level. Since 1910, Congressman Dyer had 
represented Missouri's 12th district which included the 
S ISovington# "The National Association," p. 112. 
1%t. Louis Argus, September 29, 1916. That year 
the St. Louis NAACP raised $115.37 for the anti-lynch 
campaign. 
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majority of St. Louis Negroes. 3y 1920, the black popula­
tion of that district had increased to where Negroes 
formed a majority of those voting the Republican ticket. 
As the Negro population increased. Republican Dyer's con-
20 cern for the welfare of blacks was re-doubled.- Congress­
man Dyer and Charles Pitman, an activist in local Repub­
lican politics and the chairman of the executive board of 
the branch, were friends. Another friend of Dyer's was 
Dr. T. A. Curtis, an active executive board member and 
later the first Negro president of the branch. No doubt 
these men consulted about the possibility of a federal 
21 anti-lynch law. Added to these practical motivations 
was the long-standing reputation of the Dyer family as 
a champion of the Negro. 
Whatever his motives, Dyer introduced a bill into 
Congress which would have made lynching a federal crime. 
In 1918, he told Arthur Spingarn, Chairman of the NAACP's 
22 
Legal Committee, that this was his intention. In 1922, 
2®Fainsod, "The Influence of Racial and National 
Groups in St. Louis Politics (1908-28)," pp. 103-104. 
21McKinney Interviews; May 28, 1968, August 5, 1968; 
Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968. 
22Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 226-27. 
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the House of Representatives passed Dyer's Anti-Lynching 
Bill by the vote of 230 to 119, but the Senate blocked 
its passage. During the late 1930's, the northern Demo­
crats again brought up the same type of legislation only 
to see it defeated by a Senate filibuster.23 
The St. Louis NAACP also increased its campaign 
against mob violence on the state level. Govenor Gardner 
remained silent despite a telegram from the branch asking 
him to punish the mob responsible for the Moberly, Mis­
souri lynching of 1919.24 The branch thereafter lobbied 
for a state anti-lynch law. In 1921 such a bill was de-
25 
feated in the Missouri Legislature. During the 20's 
anti-lynch legislation was a popular topic, and the 
branch sponsored such speakers as Congressman L. C. Dyer 
and Walter White from the NAACP national headquarters to 
discuss this issue in St. Louis.2® In the early 1930's, 
2 3 jack, History of the National Association. Assoc­
iation for the Advancement of Colored People (Bostoni 
Meadon Publishing Co., 1943), pp. 31-32. 
24St. Louis Argus, November 21, 1919. 
2^Ibid., October 21, 1921. 
26Jbid., April 20, 1923. 
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another effort was made to obtain an anti-lynch statute 
for Missouri. The bill was introduced by State Senator 
Michael Kinney# Democrat from St. Louis, and it passed 
27 
both houses only to be vetoed by Govenor Caulfield. 
Even as late as 1938, anti-lynching was still an issue. 
The branch sent letters to president Roosevelt and the 
Govenors of Alabama and Louisiana protesting lynchings, 
28 
but without result. 
The St. Louis branch played an integral part in the 
NAACP's anti-lynch campaign. Much exertion went into the 
anti-lynch campaign, but anti-lynch laws were never en­
acted by either Congress or the state of Missouri. This 
part of the attack on mob action was not successful, but 
the original objective of the NAACP pertaining to educa­
tion did attain results. As Roy Wilkins pointed out, 
hardly anyone of prominence spoke out against lynching 
in 1919, yet by the late 1930*s, public opinion had been 
reversed.^ 
28Ibid., September 29, 1938. 
29Rayford W. Logan, ed. What the Negro Wants, 
(Chapel Hillt University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 
p. 119. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEADERSHIP CHANGE, WHITE TO BLACK 1919-1932 
During the 1920's, the people of this nation were 
pre-occupied with enjoying themselves. The popularity 
of sports, motion pictures, and the automobile all attest 
to this concern with personal gratification. An equally 
important characteristic of the 20*s was summed up by 
President Coolidge when he remarked, "The business of 
America was business." Almost everyone worked hard at 
acquiring his share of the prosperity. Americans were 
less inclined toward reform movements at this time, for 
people concerned with business and pleasure usually have 
little time for idealistic notions. Under these condi­
tions, it is little wonder that liberal and reform groups 
suffered or found themselves exerting much effort just to 
keep the gains they had made in the past. 
The NAACP, generally falling into the classification 
of a reform group, found itself beset with the same over­
all problems of other such organizations. The finances 
of the national were such that the continuation of the 
47 
48 
Association was a day-to-day problem. Any group existing 
on a subsistence level could hardly be expected to have 
a well-planned dynamic program. The legal activities of 
the NAACP were extremely limited, and most of the work 
was relegated to the various branches."1" 
The St. Louis NAACP relied upon the national office 
for direction and support. In the era after World War I, 
the national was often unable to give this guidance, and 
partly because of this, the local NAACP fell into periods 
of inactivity. The branch's hibernation during the winter 
of 1918-19 caused the people of St. Louis "...to wonder 
what had become of the local branch of the NAACP?"2 The 
St. Louis Argus in 1922 pointed out that people would 
support a group which tojk the lead, but the "mere main­
taining of an organization does not justify its existence 
when the real work of the organization is being neglected. 
^William Otis McMahon, Jr., "The Litigation of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo­
ple, 1910-42." (Unpublished Master's dissertation), 
Howard University, Washington D. C., June 1942), p. 14. 
2 
St. Louis Argus. February 28, 1919. 
3Ibid.. June 9, 1922. 
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Throughout the post war years, membership campaigns 
took most of the branch's energy, and in some years it 
4 was practically the only object of effort. Often as an 
incentive to secure a large membership, a prize was of-
5 fered. Most members would renew their dues each year, 
but they lacked the initiative to forward the money with­
out a reminder. The same twenty or twenty-five people 
attended the majority of the branch's meetings. At two 
or three meetings a year as many as 400 people would turn 
& 
out to hear a well-known speaker. The maintenance of 
the Association in St. Louis, given the condition of the 
period, was a herculean task. 
Lacking an overall plan of attack from the national 
headquarters, the branch's efforts were sporadic and 
generally limited to matters of local concern. These 
^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968. 
5 St. Louis Argus. February 18, 1927. A trip to New 
York or $150 was offered to the person securing the 
largest amount of money over $300. Some membership dues 
were one dollar per year. This was a large order especial­
ly during the 1920s when membership seldom exceeded 1,000. 
^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968. 
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activities were basically of a defensive nature. In the 
summer of 1919, under George L. Vaughn's direction, a com­
mittee investigated the complaints of Negro soldiers who had 
been gassed and wounded, but whose discharge papers claimed 
7 they had had no battle engagement. The branch appointed 
a special committee that year to help prev^rit riots like 
O 
those experienced in Chicago and Washington, D. C. The 
branch's activities in 1920 included helping prevent the 
extradition of a seventeen-year old boy to Tennessee and 
the investigation of the murder of a Negro at Webster 
9 Groves, Missouri. The following year, the branch fought 
the formation of the Ku Klux Klan in St. Louis. Protests 
declaring the purposes of the Klan to be illegal were made 
to city and state officials.^"0 In 1923, Mayor Kiel of 
St. Louis addressed one of the branch's m eetings,and 
2,181 signatures from St. Louis were added to the petition 
7St. Louis Argus, April 26, 1919. 
3Ibid.. August 8, 1919. 
9Ibid., January 21, 1921. 
1QIbid.. May 13, 1921. 
i:LIbid.. July 20, 1923. 
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circulated by the NAACP for the "Houston martyrs" in 
12 prison at Leavenworth, Kansas. The NAACP hoped that if 
enough signatures were obtained the President would pardon 
the Negro soldiers who they felt were unjustly imprisoned. 
Starting in 1924, the branch became involved in the re­
strictive covenant cases arising in St. Louis. Segregated 
housing was achieved in St. Louis by restrictive covenants 
after the Supreme Court declared the Louisville segrega­
tion ordinance unconstitutional. Restrictive covenants 
were private agreements between neighbors declaring that 
none of the parties would sell their houses to Negroes. 
These contracts were used to cause the eviction of Negroes 
who had moved into neighborhoods covered by such agree­
ments. The handling of these cases lacked a comprehen­
sive plan. In 1931 the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld 
the Cote Brillante Avenue Restrictive Covenant and Negroes 
were given sixty days to vacate the white neighborhood.13 
^Ibid., December 28, 1923; January 4, 1924. Members 
of an Army company of Negroes had gotten into a gun battle 
with some local whites of Houston, Texas. They were con­
victed and sent to Leavenworth Army Prison. The NAACP felt 
that this was unjust because the soldiers had merely de­
fended themselves. 
13Ibid., March 27, 1925; October 9, 1925; October 16, 
1931. 
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The branch in 1928 was also involved in fighting the extra­
dition of Reverend P. A. Cantrell who did not want to be 
sent back to Mississippi to face mail fraud charges.^ 
The year 1929 marked the beginnings of increased 
activity on the part of the St. Louis NAACP branch. The 
activity was noted by the St. Louis Argus and more space 
was devoted to its enterprises. For example, in 1929, the 
branch raised the issue of police brutality for the first 
time. The local NAACP became engaged in this fight by 
15 
investigating complaints. As the effects of the de­
pression began to take hold, there was increased compe­
tition for jobs. The branch started a "buy where you can 
work" movement and formed a committee to check on employ­
ment. By the late 1920's and early 1930*s, the St. 
Louis MAACP was beginning to become more energetic, 
which was an indication of the aggressive nature it was 
to assume by the mid 1930*s. 
14Ibid.. June 29, 1928. 
•*-5St. Louis Argus, May 24, 1929; October 4, 1929. 
^Ibid., May 2, 1930; October 28, 1932. 
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Perhaps the most significant development during the 
1920*s was the change in leadership. The national head­
quarters had been, up to that time, largely controlled 
and administered by whites. During the 1920's, the organi­
zation's leadership gradually changed in complexion from 
17 white to black. As this transformation took place at 
the national office, the branches were also having a sim-
18 ilar experience. 
White St. Louisans played a significant role in the 
St. Louis branch during the early years. Whites were con­
spicuous in the formation of the branch in 1914, in the 
branch's efforts for anti-lynch legislation. Three par­
ticular Caucasians were valuable. Roger N. Baldwin 
helped organize the groups opposed to the segregation 
ordinance of 1916. Gustavus Tuckerman was active in 
starting the branch, and he served as the first permanent 
17Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. 1909-1920. I, 291; 
St. James, The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, pp. 101-103; McMahon, "The Litigation of 
the National Association," p. 23. 
"^Kellogg, A History of the NAACP. I, 292-293. 
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president from 1914 through 1916. Rev. John Day was 
active from the beginning, and he held the office of 
president from 1917 through 1923. Whites were selected 
as presidents in order to lend prestige to the Associa­
tion and because of their connections with the white com­
munity. For example. Rev. Day was the minister of the 
Unitarian Church which included in its membership many 
prominent St. Louisans. The white presidents were 
basically nominal officers who did not concern themselves 
with the day-to-day affairs of the Association. They 
usually attended few meetings other than the annual meet­
ing.1-^ 
From the branch's inception, the brunt of the work 
was done by the black St. Louisans. More often than not, 
the Chairman of the Executive Committee ran the organi­
zation in the early years.20 Three Negro chairmen were 
outstanding. Dr. T. A. Curtis was active from the begin­
ning, and later became the first Negro president of the 
branch. Charles Pitman gave much time, energy, and money 
"^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968. 
20ibia. 
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to the branch, particularly during the fight against the 
residential segregation law. Attorney George L. Vaughn 
served usefully, dividing his time between the NAACP, his 
law practice, and local politics. Although Vaughn and 
Pitman never became presidents of the branch, some accounts 
21 incorrectly remembered them serving in that capacity. 
This is testimony to the fact that the Chairman of the 
Executive Committee furnished most of the leadership in 
the early years. After the first black man became presi­
dent, this process was reversed. The presidents of the 
local NAACP, thereafter, dominated the Association, not 
only functioning as presiding officers, but as guides to 
its everyday affairs. 
There were many signs indicating the move towards 
more black domination of the St. Louis NAACP. Increas­
ingly, the St. Louis Argus dwelled upon the ehair.oan 
of the Executive Committee, and by 1922, the white presi­
dent was scarcely mentioned. Early in 1923, the branch 
moved the office of the secretary into the building 
21st. Louis Bicentennial corp., Negroes—Their Gift 
to St. Louis, (Employees Loan Co.), 1964, pp. 37-39? 
McKinney, interviews May 28, 1968 and August 5, 1968. 
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occupied by the St. Louis Argus.22 Also during that year, 
the branch reached a new low. The membership campaign 
could not be handled by the Association and had to be 
23 organized by the City Federation of Women's Clubs. The 
branch was experiencing one of its periodic internal 
battles and perhaps this explains the low ebb reached 
24 that year. The branch even postponed its elections in 
order to give the candidate committee more time to find a 
25 suitable person for president. They finally selected 
Dr. Thomas A. Curtis, a Negro who had served as the Chair­
man of the Executive Board for 1923. 
Dr. Curtis' life was an interesting one, but for our 
purpose, he had two particular characteristics which were 
shared by the vast majority of the branch's presidents. 
He was born and educated outside of St. Louis, and secondly, 
his occupation was a professional one. Dr. Curtis was 
Alabama's only Negro dentist when a confrontation with 
22St. Louis Argus. March 9, 1923. 
23Ibid., April 13, 1923 April 20, 1923. 
24The Crisis. XXVI, (June, 1923), 66-67. 
23The St. Louis Argus. November 16, 1923. 
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southern white violence, and southern officialdom's in-
26 
difference caused him to move north in 1896. Most of 
the presidents to follow Curtis came from southern or 
border states, and they probably sought by moving not only 
to help themselves materially, but also to improve the 
racial climate in which they lived. Moving as they did, 
implies that they were either aggressive or idealistic 
or both. These characteristics were in demand by an or­
ganization such as the NAACP. Almost all of the presi-
27 dents earned their living by a profession. This was 
important because it freed them, to a large degree, from 
financial dependence upon the local white community. 
To recapitulate, the 1920's were difficult years for 
the St. Louis NAACP branch. These were years when the 
branch barely managed to survive the handicaps of internal 
divisions, lack of guidance from the national office, and 
the conservatism of the period. Given these disadvantages, 
2®Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968. A Negro cotton 
gin owner had had his gin burnt down by whites in the 
vicinity of Montgomery, Alabama. Dr. Curtis was on a com­
mittee that went to the Govenor of Alabama to ask for more 
protection. The Govenor received them in a patronizing 
manner and recommended that if they were good people, the 
whites would treat them accordingly. 
27Appendix, #1. 
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it was remarkable that the branch was able to survive the 
white to black leadership change and still engage in some 
defensive activity. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ESPY AND REDMOND ADMINISTRATIONS: 
DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS 
Two factors, national guidance and keen branch leader­
ship, merged during the depression and war years to produce 
an impressive list of major accomplishments. The central 
characters in the St. Louis branch's new surge of energy 
were Joseph E. Mitchell, Henry D. Espy, and Sidney R. Red­
mond. Espy and Redmond were lawyers who had come to St. 
Louis in the late 1920*s. They formed a partnership which 
is still in existence today. 
Henry D. Espy was brought up near the small town of 
Gifford, Florida, where his father homesteaded 160 acres 
of land. He came to St. Louis after graduating from the 
Howard University Law School. Espy served as an officer 
of various organizations a few of which were the Mound 
City Bar Association, the Republican Party 6th Ward organ­
ization, and the NAACP. 
^"Henry D. Espy, Personal interview with author held 
705 Chestnut, St. Louis, Mo., August 9, 1968. 
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Sidney Redmond was raised in Jackson, Mississippi, 
and he was graduated from the Harvard Law School. After 
settling in St. Louis, he became active in many different 
organizations. After a few years he was elected president 
of the local Negro Bar Association. Aside from his busy 
law practice, he wrote "Legal Hints" in the St. Louis 
Argus. As early as 1931, he served as counsel for the 
NAACP.^ Redmond was a member of the National Board dur­
ing the late 1930"s and early 1940*s, and he served as 
the State NAACP President. One of his interests was 
local Republican politics, and he held the offices of 
Associate City Counselor and Alderman in St. Louis.4 
2St. Louis NAACP Branch. Minutes of the Meetings of 
the Executive Board, January 26, 1949. There were two 
bar associations in St. Louis before 1950; one having 
only black members and the other having only white mem­
bers. Redmond was refused admittance into the St. Louis 
Bar Association (white) because of race in 1949. Black 
lawyers usually belonged to the Mound City Bar Associa­
tion. 
^McMahon, "The Litigation of the National Associa­
tion, " pp. 102-3. Redmond defended Tom Carraway of 
Biloxi, Mississippi. The trial ended in 1934 when the 
court sentenced Carraway to prison for life. 
4Sidney R. Redmond. Personal interviews with author 
held 705 Chestnut, St. Louis, Mo., May 27, 1968 and Aug­
ust 13, 1968. Redmond was a city alderman until the 
mid 1950's. 
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Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond provided much of the 
leadership for the branch from 1934 to 1945 by serving 
as presidents during these years. They devoted the time 
and energy necessary to turn the St. Louis NAACP into one 
of the most active branches in the country. Equally im­
portant was the fact that both were lawyers. This quali­
fication proved indispensable, for most of the important 
achievements of the St. Louis branch required minds ex­
perienced in law. 
The third man mentioned above was Joseph E. Mitchell. 
Mitchell was elected as the president of the local NAACP 
in 1933 and 1934. He was a self-educated man who came to 
5 St. Louis at the turn of the century. In 1912 with the 
backing of a fraternal insurance group, he started the St. 
Louis Argus. As early as the World War I he organized a 
Negro political machine and became a power behind the 
6 
scene in local Republican politics. Anyone reading the 
St. Louis Argus during the pre-World War II era would 
5 Curtis interview, August 6, 1968. Curtis remembered 
helping Mitchell with his spelling and grammar. 
^Herman Dreer, "Negro Leadership in Saint Louiss A 
Study in Race Relations." (Unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion), University of Chicago, September, 1955, pp. 97-100. 
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have to agree with Mitchell when he wrote, "the Arcrus has 
been the life blood of the local Branch of the NAACP dur-
7 ing the past twenty-five years." From the very begin­
ning, the St. Louis Argus provided the branch with pub­
licity, an ingredient greatly needed by any volunteer or­
ganization. 
Circumstances helped bring about the emergence of 
these leaders by the early 1930's. The national office 
was moving toward a more aggressive posture, and there 
were many in the branch who felt this aggressiveness 
should be duplicated locally. This group wanted the 
branch to take the offensive. To achieve this, some felt 
new leadership was needed while others felt President Cur­
tis had held that office long enough. Curtis agreed with 
some of these opinions and attempted to step aside in 
1931.8 
A division in the branch developed over the selec­
tion of the person to follow Curtis. Finally, Joseph E. 
7St. Louis Argus. May 7, 1937. 
Q 
°Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968; Espy Interview, 
August 9, 1968; Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968 and 
August 13, 1968. 
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Mitchell won the presidency over Rev. E. R. Clark in 
9 December, 1932. Mitchell served one year, was elected 
to another but asked Henry Espy to finish out his 1934 
term because of failing health.1-^ Mitchell provided the 
transition from the defensive-minded leaders of the 1920's 
to the more aggressive legal-minded leadership provided 
by Espy and Redmond. 
The branch became involved in a variety of activities 
during the 1930's and early 1940. The branch's efforts 
caused a removal of the signs "Negro" from the restrooms 
at the railroad station. In 1936, an essay contest on 
Negro history was sponsored by the branch. The branch 
continued handling cases involving police brutality and 
increased its effort in this direction. The local NAACP was 
active in about twenty-five cases of police brutality in 
1941. However, by 1944 the Association furnished counsel 
^Curtis Interview, August 6, 1968; St. Louis Argus, 
December 9, 1932. 
lOEspy Interview, August 9, 1968. 
U-St. Louis Argus, November 10, 1933? February 14, 
1936. 
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in only two cases. The decrease proved to the branch the 
12 
effectiveness of their campaign. 
On the political front, the branch was active under 
the Espy and Redmond administrations, in 1943 alone the 
branch worked with Alderman Joseph C. Caston in drafting 
a city ordinance prohibiting racial discrimination in 
restaurants located on city-owned property? sponsored a 
civil rights bill in the Missouri Legislature; and led 
three delegations to Jefferson City in behalf of pending 
13 legislation. 
The St. Louis NAACP never developed a general pro-
14 
gram of job procurement during these years, but much 
was done in specific areas. For example the branch ob­
tained more and better jobs for Negroes in work projects 
12St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin, 1940-41; 1944. 
From 1933 through 1944, the branch printed these one page 
flyers telling of its achievements for the preceding year. 
The titles varied sometimes appearing as Branch Achieve­
ments, Branch Accomplishments, or Branch Bulletin. They 
will be referred throughout this paper as it appears in 
this footnote. 
13Ibid.. 1943. 
^Espy interview, August 9, 1968; Redmond interviews, 
May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968. 
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15 started by the federal government. partial success was 
achieved in the St. Louis Post Office and the St. Louis 
Police Department. At the Post Office the branch secured 
promotions for Negroes into four new departments where 
they had previously been excluded. The branch held con­
ferences with the police board and the Govenor in order 
to encourage the hiring of more black policemen. More 
were hired, but in 1944 the forty-six black policemen 
made up only 3% of the total force.1*2 
The branch opened a business office in 1935. Mrs. 
Ruth Roland Wheeler, the secretary of the branch, was in 
charge of the office, and it was open from 11*00 a.m. to 
17 2*00 p.m. on weekdays. The office space, telephone, 
and often the secretarial help was provided by lawyers 
18 
Espy and Redmond. During the war years of 1943 and 
1944, the branch sent almost 600 telegrams and over 4,000 
15 
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1938-39? St. 
Louis Argus, February 14, 1936. 
16Ibid? 1938-1944. 
17St. Louis Arcus, November 29, 1935. 
•^Redmond Interviews,May 27, 1968 and August 13, 
1968. 
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letters pertaining to NAACP business out of Redmond 
19 and Espy's office. 
It was not an accident that the National NAACP Con­
vention was held in St. Louis at the beginning of the 
Henry Espy Administration. Espy and Redmond attended 
the 1934 National Convention seeking the convention for 
St. Louis the following year. They thought that holding 
the convention in St, Louis would attract more members, 
and it would act as a further stimulus for branch activi­
ties. The 1935 convention was held in St. Louis, and it 
provided the branch with what the St. Louis NAACP leader­
ship had planned for—publicity and stimulation.20 
During the depression and war years, efforts were 
made to develop regional organizations. Herbert J. 
Seligman of the national office started the plan in 
21 1930. The Kansas City NAACP branch organized the first 
-^St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1943-1944. 
20Espy interview, August 9, 1968; St. Louis Argus. 
July 19, 1935, Headline—"NAACP Had Rebirth at Meeting 
Here." 
21McMahon, "The Litigation of the National Associa­
tion, "p. 37. 
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22 Missouri State Conference in 1931, but the state-wide 
organization soon became dormant. It was not until 1940, 
under the prodding of Sidney Redmond that the Missouri 
State Association of Branches was revived. Redmond 
spoke in towns throughout Missouri to create interest in 
the state organization and to "inspire" rural branches 
towards action. He served as the President of the State 
Association during the war years, but because of limited 
23 funds, it was "very inactive." 
The primary concern of the branch during the Espy 
and Redmond years was civil rights. The Vashon High School 
Suit was one of the successful cases handled by the St. 
Louis NAACP. In 1934 the branch joined with other groups 
to protest the building of an elementary school on the 
Vashon High School grounds. St. Louis public Schools 
were strictly segregated until the mid-1950's, and 
Vashon was a Negro high school. Large segments of the 
22Robert W. Bagnall, "NAACP Branch Activities," 
The Crisis, XL (June, 1931), 206. 
23The Crisis. XLVII (November, 1940), 360? St. Louis 
NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1940-1941. 
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Negro community opposed the school board in the selec­
tion of this site for the new Negro grade school. The 
NAACP, under Henry Espy's leadership, provided much of 
the guidance and money in the fight against this school 
site selection. In order to put pressure on the school 
board, the local NAACP opposed the 1934 school bond issue. 
This led to some internal problems for the branch. Many 
members were St. Louis public school teachers, and they 
felt compromised when the branch opposed the bond issue. 
To resolve this apparent conflict of interest and to pro-
24 tect their jobs, many teachers resigned from the NAACP. 
The bond issue passed, and the Negro leaders decided to 
take the issue to court. Lawyers George L. Vaughn, 
Robert L. Witherspoon, and Sidney Redmond argued the 
case.^5 Finally in December, 1937, Judge Robert J. Kirk-
wood decided that "the area there (Vashon High School 
26 grounds) was already too small to whip a cat on," 
O A  
Espy Interview, August 9, 1968; St. Louis Argus, 
December 28, 1934. Robert P. Watts, Secretary of the 
local, was one of many to resign, and the Argus questioned 
his motives by asking, "Was it pressure or fright?" 
25The Crisis. XLV (January, 1938), 21. 
26 Robert L. Witherspoon, Personal Interview with 
author held 1518 Sarah, St. Louis, Mo., August 31, 1968. 
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and he issued the permanent injunction sought by the NAACP 
lawyers. 
The branch's legal efforts proved unsuccessful in 
another case arising during the mid-1930's. A new muni­
cipal auditorium for St. Louis was opened in 1934. The 
building was christened Kiel Auditorium after the Repub­
lican Mayor of the World War I era. At low-brow events 
such as prize fights and political assemblies, there was 
no problem of segregation. However, when the Grand Opera 
leased the Auditorium, a Negro public school teacher com­
plained to one of St. Louis' leading Negro Democrats, 
27 David Grant, that he could only buy a segregated seat. 
Joseph P. Harris, a lawyer, was chosen to be the plain­
tiff in the case primarily because he was willing, and 
he paid property taxes to support Kiel Auditorium.23 
Harris attempted to buy tickets to the Grand Opera, and 
found he would have to sit in the right or left side of 
2 9 the balcony. ' Numerous meetings were held between the 
27 David M. Grant, personal interviews with author 
held 705 Olive, St. Louis, Mo., June 1, 1968 and August 10, 
1968. 
23Espy Interview, August 9, 1968. 
29Harris vs. City of St. Louis, III S.W. 2d 997,1938-
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city administration's representatives, Guy Golterman who 
had licensed the building for the Grand Opera from the 
city, and the Negro leadership. After one meeting, the 
following conversation was reported to have taken place 
between Charles M. Hay, City Counselor and Joe Harris: 
Hay: "Joe, I don't know why you want to attend 
the opera. All I do at the opera is sleep." 
Harris: "Well Mr. Hay, I have as much right to 
sleep there as you.n3° 
The city officials held firm in their policy of allowing 
the person leasing the building complete discretion on 
admissions. In order to placate the Negro leadership, 
the Grand Opera liberalized its seating policy to allow 
groups of seats to be sold to Negroes throughout the 
31 Auditorium, but still on a segregated basis. The pro­
posal was unacceptable to the local NAACP, and prepara­
tions were made for a more extensive battle. 
The St. Louis NAACP fought on two fronts in its 
attempt to force the city to discontinue its policy of 
30Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
31Ibid.; Espy Interview, August 9, 1968. 
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allowing segregation in Kiel Auditorium, in 1935, the 
Association opposed the Memorial 3ond issue in the hope 
that the city officials would h^ve second thoughts. The 
branch President, Henry Espy, explained that this move was 
a "retaliatory" gesture because of the restrictive use 
32 of Kiel Auditorium. This approach failed, for the city 
administration did not change its position. 
While the local NAACP fought the bond issue, court 
action was also started. The Association brought suit 
in the St. Louis Circuit Court against the city of St. 
Louis in 1934. This venture failed and was then taken to 
the St. Louis Court of Appeals. The attorneys for appel­
lant Joseph Harris were Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond. 
It was Harris' position that the city did not have the 
right to allow segregation. His tax money helped pay for 
the building of Kiel, and therefore, he ought to be ad­
mitted the same as anyone else. The city argued that 
they were not the party who discriminated and that accord­
ing to state law, the party leasing a building had the 
right as a proprietor to set the conditions of admittance. 
The court sided with the city, and the Missouri Supreme 
32 St. Louis Argus. August 30, 1935. 
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Court declined to hear the case in 1938 because no Con-
33 stitutional issues were involved. 
Failure in the courts did not end this controversy. 
What had been sought by litigation was achieved without 
court order. Soon after the case was decided, the city 
changed its position, and thereafter what segregation 
34 occurred at Kiel Auditorium was on a voluntary basis. 
During World War II, the branch membership, along 
with the rest of the country, spent much time thinking 
about military affairs. The NAACP leadership was con­
cerned about the Negro in the armed services. Because 
of the pressures brought by the branch, discriminatory 
signs were removed at the local U.S. Medical Depot and 
3 5 the Canteen at the Veterans Hospital."'"' 
Up to World War II, Missouri had never sent a Negro 
to West Point. The branch set out to change this tra­
dition. In 1943 because of the efforts of Redmond, 
Espy and others. Congressman L. E. Miller of St. Louis 
33Harris vs. City of St. Louis, III S.W. 2d 995-1000. 
34 Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968; 
Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968. 
^5St. Louis NAACP Branch, Bulletin. 1940-1944. 
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nominated a Negro principal and Negro alternates to Wast 
Point. Congressman Miller, a Republican, had many friends 
in the Negro community, and since he needed a large Negro 
vote every two years, he was favorably disposed toward 
granting this favor. The outcome was the admission and 
graduation from West Point of the first Negro from Mis-
36 souri. No doubt this feat achieved by the St. Louis 
NAACP was a point of pride for St. Louis Negroes, indeed 
for all Missouri Negroes. 
Some of the achievements of the Espy and Redmond 
administrations had importance beyond the borders of Mis­
souri. Redmond and Espy served as toastmasters for the 
Anniversary Club of St. Louis. One responsibility of 
the toastmaster was to obtain guest speakers for club 
meetings. The Mexican Consul stationed in St. Louis 
spoke at one of the Anniversary Club meetings, in var­
ious conversations with the Mexican Consul, Redmond and 
Espy pointed out the unfairness of requiring a $500 
3^Ibid., 1943; 1944. Charles L. Smith was the first 
Negro from Missouri to enter West Point; Guy S. Ruffin. 
Personal Interview with author held 3520 Laclede, St. 
Louis, Mo., August 31, 1968. Smith was graduated and is 
now an officer in the U.S. Army. 
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deposit from United States Negroes entering Mexico. The 
Mexican Consul agreed, and he wrote the officials in Mex-
37 ico. In 1939 the branch received written assurance that 
38 this policy would be discontinued. This equalization of 
treatment at the Mexican border served to illustrate how 
with quiet consultation, the branch was able to achieve 
some of its goals without public threats, political wire 
pulling, or court action. 
The St. Louis NAACP branch obtained some of its ob­
jectives through thoughtful conversation with the right 
people, but generally while Espy and Redmond provided the 
leadership, the primary emphasis for change came through 
the courts. The courts have been the favorite target for 
the NAACP. It seemed only natural that once the NAACP 
passed from the doldrums of the 1920's and decided to break 
new ground, it would choose for its leaders, men skilled 
in the area where change was sought. Not only was more 
37Letter, Lie. Raul E. Valenzuela cons. Depto. Inf. 
Consular Tlatelolco D.P. Mexico to Daniel Kelleher, 
June 22, 1968. The consular service of Mexico claimed 
that a legislative or administrative policy never existed 
that required a deposit from Negroes entering Mexico. 
^®Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968; 
The Crisis, XLVI (May, 1939), 149. 
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aggressive leadership needed by the branch during the 
depression and war years, but also leaders skillful in 
law. Sidney Redmond and Henry Espy filled these needs 
most adequately as the many accomplishments of the 1930's 
and early 1940's bear witness. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ST. LOUIS NAACP BRANCH AND THE GAINES CASE 
A few years before World War II, the Supreme Court 
of the United States handed down a decision that was to 
mark the turning point for segregated education. The 
high court's decision in the Gaines case forced the states 
providing separate education for whites and Negroes to 
re-evaluate that policy and to lend more than tacit sup­
port to Negro education. The decision formed the legal 
bedrock for the desegregation decisions following World 
War II in graduate level education, and it helped pro­
vide the judicial atmosphere for the ordering of local 
public schools desegregation in the mid-1950's. This 
case involving a young Negro from St. Louis and the Uni­
versity of Missouri gained importance far surpassing its 
local significance. It provided the nation with an ans­
wer to a pressing problem, and at the same time it 
heightened the controversy revolving around state and 




The Gaines Case was the first educational suit 
sponsored by the NAACP to reach the Supreme Court. The 
case was successful due to the cooperation between the 
NAACP and its St. Louis branch. As usual, the stimula­
tion and direction came from the national office. Under 
the leadership of Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond the 
branch was willing and eager to take to the offensive. 
The outcome was the accomplishment of the branch's most 
notable contribution to the advancement of black people. 
The Gaines Case, indeed the NAACP's entire attack on 
segregated education, did not happen by chance. It evolved 
because of a plan and financial help from an outside source. 
Nathan Margold, who managed the American Fund for Public 
Service, counselled with the NAACP leaders. In May, 1930 
both parties agreed to a total sum of $100,000 to be pro­
vided in periodic allotments for the financing of a legal 
offensive against segregated schools. Margold*s original 
three part plan included concentration on the worst states; 
forcing equality under a dual system in each state, thus 
making it too costly to continue segregated education; 
and focusing public attention on segregates education.1 
^McMahon, "The Litigation of the National Associa­
tion, " p. 18; Robert McLaren Sawyer, "The Gaines Case: 
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The depression caused a shrinkage in the assets of 
the American Fund, and it was 1934 before any money was 
made available to the NAACP. Ihe amount available was 
reduced from $100,000 to $10,000 in that year, and ulti­
mately, about $21,000 was contributed to the NAACP's 
2 efforts to desegregate education. The reduction in 
funds caused not only a delay but a shift in the plan 
of attack. Charles H. Houston, vfao became the NAACP's 
full-time special counsel in 1935, planned the new attack. 
Houston's blueprint entailed the same basic idea as the 
Margold plan. The hope was to make it so costly to pro­
vide a dual system of education that the states would 
voluntarily desegregate, instead of a broad attack, how­
ever, a pin point thrust was made on the graduate univer­
sity level, and the worst areas were left for later as 
Its Background and Influence on the University of Mis­
souri and Lincoln University 1936-1950." (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Missouri University, January, 1966), 
pp. 101-103; Thurgood Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent 
Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in Education Through 
Resort to the Courts," Journal of Negro Education, XXI 
(Svimmer, 1952), 318. 
2Sawyer, "The Gaines Case," pp. 103-104; McMahon, 
"The Litigation of the National," p. 20. 
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3 precedents were sought in the border states. 
The NAACP lost its first case in 1933 against the 
4 
University of North Carolina on technical grounds. in 
1935, the NAACP had a better record. Defeat came in 
Tennessee where a Negro was refused entrance into the 
University of Tennessee on the technical point that ad­
ministrative remedies had not been exhausted. The suit 
against the University of Kentucky ended in the establish­
ment of a makeshift engineering course at a Negro college.5 
Victory finally came when Donald Murray attempted to 
enter the University of Maryland's law school. The state 
court of appeals ruled that out-of-state tuition paid by 
the state to Negroes attending schools outside of Mary­
land was discriminatory. The court ordered Murray ad­
mitted to the University Law School since no state 
official was authorized to establish a new school for 
Negroes. This was a significant breakthrough for the 
3 Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent Efforts," 
pp. 317-318y St. Louis Arcrus. July 19, 1935; Charles H. 
Houston, "Educational inequalities Must Go!", The Crisis, 
XLII (October, 1935), 300-301. 
4McMahon, "The Litigation of the National," pp. 232-
235. The president of the Negro college refused to cer­
tify the plaintiff's scholastic record. 
5 
Sawyer, "The Gaines Case," pp. 109-110. 
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NAACP, and immediately plans were made to continue the 
attack. It was at this point that a request for legal 
aid came from a St. Louis Negro.^ 
Lloyd L. Gaines was a lean handsome young man of 
some twenty-three years when he asked for the aid of the 
NAACP. He was the youngest of five children brought by 
their mother from Oxford, Mississippi, in 1926. He 
worked his way through high school and college, receiv­
ing some additional financial help from scholarships and 
his two older brothers. He attended Stowe Teacher's Col­
lege in St. Louis for a year, and then entered Lincoln 
University in Jefferson City, Missouri. On August 4, 
1935, Gaines graduated from Lincoln as an honor student 
and president of his class.' A few days later, he 
registered with the placement bureau at Lincoln. Early 
in June of that year, he received a University of Mis­
souri catalog. Gaines could not find a teaching position, 
6Ibid., pp. 107-108; Harry S. Ashmore, The Negro 
and the Schools. (Chapel Hill; University of North Caro­
lina Press, 1954), pp. 31-32. 
7Lucile H. Bluford, "The Lloyd Gaines Story," The 
Journal of Educational Sociology, XXXII (February, 1959), 
242-243. 
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and in August he again wrote the University of Missouri. 
This time he filled out the application blank for the law 
school, and at the same time he wrote the President of 
Lincoln University asking that his transcripts be forwarded 
to the University of Missouri. In this letter, Gaines in­
dicated that he knew his application had a special mean­
ing. He hoped that what he was doing would improve oppor-
g 
tunities for all Negroes. 
It was not until the registrar received Gaines' tran­
script that he knew Gaines was a Negro. The month of 
September passed with little accomplished except an ex­
change of many letters between Gaines, the University of 
Missouri, and Lincoln University. It appeared that the 
University of Missouri was not going to admit him? Lincoln 
University did not have a law school? and his only re-
g 
course was to apply for an out-of-state scholarship. 
As Gaines was writing letters, he was also convers­
ing with a St. Louis public school teacher who was active 
in the St. Louis NAACP. Zaid D. Lenoir suggested to Gaines 
that he allow his name to be used by the NAACP in a law 
8Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 152, 155-157. 
9Ibid., pp. 157-159. 
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suit. Gaines contacted the branch's leaders in late 
September and they in turn sent the request for legal 
aid to the national office.10 
It was not mere coincidence that Lloyd Gaines de­
cided to apply to the all white University of Missouri. 
The NAACP's successful suit against the University of 
Maryland was well publicized and most educated Negroes 
of Gaines* caliber were cognizant of the victory. In 
July, 1935, the NAACP held its national convention in 
St. Louis. At this convention, Charles Houston outlined 
the attack which had started against the University of 
Maryland. He made it clear that this was just the begin-
ing.11 The NAACP had informed its branches that it would 
finance a plaintiff fitting its needs, and the St. Louis 
branch let it be known that it would like to see the 
12 matter tested in Missouri. 
10Edward T. Clayton, "The Strange Disappearance of 
Lloyd Gaines," Ebony, VI (May, 1951), 31; Espy Interview, 
August 9, 1968; Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968; 
August 13, 1968. 
^St. Louis Argus. July 19, 1935. 
12 Redmond interviews. May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968; 
Houston, "Educational Inequalities Must GoJ", p. 300. 
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The NAACP could not afford to spread itself thin. 
It wanted the best possible plaintiff to achieve its 
goal. The Association had many requests for legal aid, 
but it selected Gaines to accomplish its ends. The 
reasons for his selection were many. Charles Houston 
felt the need for Negro lawyers was critical if Negroes 
were to achieve full equality.13 Gaines' excellent 
scholastic record was a consideration. The fact that he 
was a product of Missouri's segregated schools lessened 
the chance that the state would argue that he was not 
qualified. To argue along these lines would be to admit 
the inequality of education provided Negroes in Mis­
souri.14 Missouri had a policy of providing scholarships 
which paid part of the tuition to those Negroes wishing 
to do graduate or professional studies outside the state. 
States throughout the nation were adopting this method 
13Charles H. Houston, "The Need for Negro Lawyers," 
The Journal of Negro Education. IV (January, 1935), 
pp. 49-52. 
l^Espy Interview, August 9, 1968. 
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of "equalizing" education.15 The NAACP wanted to bring 
16 this policy into question. 
The NAACP in behalf of Lloyd Gaines petitioned for 
a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court. This forced 
the official at the University of Missouri to either ad­
mit Gaines or show cause why he could not enter the law 
school. By March, 1936, the University of Missouri de­
cided to formally reject Gaines because Missouri law 
would not pexrmit a person of African descent to enter 
17 a white school. 
Within three weeks, the NAACP petitioned the court 
to force the University of Missouri to open its doors to 
Gaines on the grounds that it was the only public law 
school in Missouri. The NAACP argued that state law and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
150liver C. Cox, "Provisions for Graduate Educa­
tion Among Negroes and the Prospects of a New System," 
The Journal of Negro Education, XXX (January, 1940), 23. 
Examples of states that passed out-of-state tuitions 
Missouri, 1921; West Virginia, 1927; Oklahoma, 1935; 
Maryland, 1935; Tennessee, 1936; and Texas, 1936. 
16Leon A. Ransom, "The Supreme Court Upholds Lloyd 
Gaines," The American Teacher Magazine, XXIII (January, 
1939), 15. 
^Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 160-162. 
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left the court with no other alternative than to order 
the admission of Gaines to the University of Missouri. 
Judge Dinwiddie of the Boone County Circuit Court set 
18 July 10, 1936, for the hearing of oral arguments. 
Almost 200 people, one-half of whom were black, 
crowded the sultry courtroom on that day in July. The 
lawyers representing the University of Missouri argued 
that it was public policy that required the separation 
of the races. They pointed out that under Missouri law, 
Lincoln University was supposed tocpen new schools when 
the need arose. Until new schools were opened, the 
practice of granting scholarships to black students for 
graduate studies outside Missouri served to equalize 
educational facilities. Judge Dinwiddie was impressed 
with this argument, and he denied Gaines entrance to the 
University of Missouri. The NAACP immediately filed an 
i I9 appeal. 
The appeal reached the Missouri Supreme Court in 
December, 1937. Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy, and Charles 
Houston, the same lawyers who represented Gaines in the 
18Ibid., p. 162. 
^ibid., pp. 162-163. 
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circuit court, handled the cases before the Missouri Sup­
reme Court. The arguments used by the NAACP were clearly 
stated. The out-of-state scholarships were brandedi 
...a compromise and subterfuge, all the more 
inadequate because the very essence of them is 
to withhold from a Negro citizen because of 
race, the joy and pride of studying at home in 
a state university which he helps to support. 
To counteract the state's contention that there was not 
enough demand for a law school at Lincoln, it was pointed 
out that Gaines' rights did not depend upon numbers, but 
21 rather on his rights as an individual. 
The heart of the matter was the argument that the 
out-of-state scholarships were of a temporary nature until 
Lincoln University could provide new schools. In an 
attempt to make light of this contention, the NAACP law­
yers said: 
If relator (Gaines) had the power to command 
the sun to stand still and to order time to pause 
in its flight, he might be able to wait that un­
certain date when a law course might be inaugurat-
22 ed at Lincoln University.... 
20Gaines Appellant vs. Canada. Brief for Appellee 
at 61. Prepared by Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy, and 
Charles Houston for the Supreme Court of Missouri, May 
Term, 1937, #35, 386. 
2 •'•Ibid.. p. 56. 
22 
Ibid., p. 50. 
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The Missouri Supreme Court sided with the lower court's 
opinion in rejecting the arguments presented in behalf of 
Gaines. To them, Missouri law had a clear intention, and 
that was to keep Negroes and whites separated for the pur-
21 pose of education. The NAACP lawyers used the Pearson 
vs. Murray Case as precedent, but the court found that 
there were basic differences between higher education pro­
vided Negroes in Missouri and Maryland. For example, in 
Maryland no official was authorized by law to establish 
separate schools, but in Missouri, this was the respon­
sibility of the Board of Curators of Lincoln University. 
Also Maryland's out-of-state scholarship plan was not so 
liberal as that provided by Missouri.24 To the members 
of the Missouri Supreme Court, the state was not depriv­
ing Gaines of due process of law under the 14th Amend­
ment. They pointed out the 14th Amendment provided for 
equal not identical privileges and rights. Thus Missouri's 
provisions for higher education for Negroes were found 
2 ̂ "substantially equal" to that provided for whites. 
23Gaines vs. Canada, 113 S.W. 2d, 786-787. 
24Ibid.. 791. 
25Ibid., pp. 788-790. 
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While the battle in the courts continued, there was 
close cooperation between the national office and its 
local chapter in St. Louis. Charles Houston made the 
general plans for the case. He and Sidney Redmond handled 
the oral arguments in court. All three lawyers, Redmond, 
Houston, and Espy, helped in the research and the taking 
of depositions with Redmond and Espy doing most of the 
work on the local level. It is hard to appreciate in 
1969 the hardships and chances Espy and Redmond took in 
the mid-1930's. The hardships involved financial sacri­
fices and traveling inconveniences, but more important was 
the threat of losing their professional status. The law­
yers for the University of Missouri took statements try­
ing to prove Espy and Redmond were soliciting business. 
If this charge had been proved, they would have stood in 
26 peril of disbarment. Despite this disquieting threat, 
Redmond and Espy persevered and there was never a formal 
charge. 
The NAACP was able to take large numbers of cases to 
27 court because the lawyers usually donated their services. 
2®Espy Interview, August 9, 1968? Redmond Interviews, 
May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968. 
27 McMahon, "The Litigation of the National...", p. 32. 
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This tradition was upheld during the Gaines Case. Money 
was needed, however, for expenses. The national office 
paid Houston's expenses, and they also paid Gaines so he 
could go to school in Michigan. The national provided 
Redmond expense money for his trip to Washington, D. C. 
where he joined Houston for argumentation before the 
Supreme Court. The branch paid all other expenses in-
28 
curred by Redmond and Espy. 
It was early in November, 1938, when Redmond made 
the trip to Washington, D. C. The Supreme Court heard 
the oral presentations from both sides on November 9. 
On that day, the lawyers for the University of Missouri 
were embarassed several times, for the questions from the 
bench frequently forced them to correct overstatements on 
29 Missouri's generosity to Negro education. 
On December 12, 1938, the Supreme Court in a 5 to 2 
decision found in favor of Gaines. Chief Justice Hughes, 
28Espy Interview, August 9, 1968; Redmond Inter­
views, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968. 
29 "Says University of Missouri Belongs to Whites," 
The Crisis. XLV (December, 1938), 399. 
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speaking for the majority, agreed with all the basic 
arguments of the NAACPt 
Here, petitioner's Gaines__/ right was a 
personal one. It was as an individual that he 
was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, 
and the state was bound to furnish him within its 
borders facilities for legal education substan­
tially equal to those which the state there afford­
ed for persons of the white race, whether or not 
other Negroes sought the same opportunity."*0 
The court was saying that out-of-state scholarships were 
not providing equal treatment under the meaning of the 
14th Amendment. Another important feature of this rul­
ing, as shown by the quotation, was that Gaines' right to 
education was a personal one. This would, in effect, 
force Missouri and other states to establish expensive 
schools for a few Negroes within each state. This was 
in accord with the NAACP's plan, for it was thought that 
faced with this overwhelming expense the states would 
then desegregate their schools. 
Justice McReynolds wrote the dissenting opinion 
which undoubtedly reflected more closely the feeling of 
most whites in the 1930's. He questioned the intentions 
30Gaines vs. Canada, 305 U.S. 351. 
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of Gaines and saw only undesirable alternatives for Mis­
souri under the majority's opinion. The University of 
Missouri would have to abandon her law school "...or... 
break down the settled practice concerning separate schools, 
and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify both 
races."31 McReynolds saw the long run effect of this de­
cision, and what he saw, he did not savor. 
In the short run, the decision was not as sweeping as 
might have been expected. Although, it reversed the Mis­
souri Supreme Court, the case was sent back to that court 
with instructions that Gaines be admitted to Missouri Uni­
versity in the absence of other provisions which would 
32 provide him equal treatment within the state. In other 
words, the final decision of admitting Gaines to the Uni­
versity of Missouri or setting up a segregated school was 
left up to the authorities in Missouri. 
Reaction to the historic Gaines decision was predict­
able. In general, the newspapers of the North viewed it 
31Ibid., p. 353. 
32Ibid., p. 352. 
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as a "great step forward," and the newspapers of the 
33 South were less than enthusiastic. The law reviews 
reflected this same difference of opinion. The Univer­
sity of Chicago Law Review reported "...the instant de­
cision represents a bold and laudable affirmation of 
34 Negro rights." On the other hand, a voice from the 
South expressed the following hostile reaction: "The 
opinion of the dissenting justices seems to be the better 
35 
view as a fair effort to solve a difficult problem..." 
Within the informed circles of white America, the re­
action to the Gaines decision ranged from applause to 
mild criticism. 
The black community received the news of the Gaines 
decision with guarded optimism. Walter White, the Exe­
cutive Secretary of the NAACP, declared the decision 
"more sweeping" than was hoped, but he added that there 
was a long struggle ahead to get the states to obey the 
33 Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 248-251. 
"*^"The Gaines Case," University of Chicago Law Re­
view, VI (February, 1939), 305. 
35Claude L. Goza, "Admission of Negro to Law School 




court's mandate. W» E. B. DuBois was optimistic that 
Missouri would open the doors of the University of Mis­
souri to Gaines. He felt Missouri had proved herself an 
"enlightened and progressive state," and hoped she would 
37 not disappoint the Nation. The Crisis characterized 
the decision: "...as the most significant victory for 
Negro rights in the highest court of the land in the past 
38 decade." The article went on to say that the Gaines 
Case was just the beginning for this type of litigation. 
Most authorities agreed that Missouri was not yet 
ready for desegregation, and the Missouri legislature 
proved them correct. During the first few months of 1939, 
the legislature worked out its answer to the Supreme 
Court's decision. Although more than 200 black people 
39 attended the hearings in opposition to the Taylor Bill, 
it became law by May, 1939. The new law made it mandatory 
35"Darani£y Both Races," Time, XXXII (December 26, 
1938), 20. 
37William E. B. DuBois, "The Gaines Decision," The 
Commonwea1. XXIX (January 6, 1939), 282. 
33"University of Missouri Case Won," The Crisis. XLVI 
(January, 1939), 10. 
39St. Louis Argus, April 14, 1939, Lawyer David M. 
Grant acted as Chairman of the delegation and presented the 
speakers opposing the bill. 
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for the Board of Curators at Lincoln University to set up 
new schools when the need arose, and $200,000 was appro-
40 priated to provide a law school for Negroes in Missouri. 
By the summer of 1939, the NAACP lawyers found them­
selves back where they had started. The Missouri Supreme 
Court sent the case to the circuit court for a jury trial 
to decide if the newly created law school set up by the 
Missouri Legislature proved equal to that of the Uni­
versity of Missouri's Law School. If the facilities 
proved unequal, Gaines was to be admitted to the law 
school at the University of Missouri.41 On October 11, 
1939, the NAACP lawyers informed Judge Dinwiddie that 
their client was missing. By January, 1940, on the 
strength of the fact that the plaintiff was still miss-
a 
ing, the Gaines case came to an end. 
40 Norval Banksdale, "The Gaines Case and Its Effect 
on Negro Education in Missouri," School and Society, LI 
(March 9, 1940), 310-311; Sawyer, "The Gaines case," 
pp. 188-189. Previously, the Board of Curators had only 
discretionary power to establish new schools at Lincoln 
University. 
41Gaines vs. Canada, 131 S.W. 2d, 219-220. 
42Sawyer, "The Gaines Case," pp. 190-191. 
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The NAACP never had a chance to test the equality 
of the two public law schools of Missouri. With the 
financial help of his family and the NAACP, Gaines grad­
uated from the University of Michigan with an M.A. degree 
in economics. He worked for a time as a W.P.A. clerk in 
the Michigan State Civil Service Department. Then he 
came back to St. Louis and worked at a service station. 
Gaines told friends as late as December, 1938, that he 
expected to enter the University of Missouri Law School 
43 by the fall of 1939. Redmond and Espy helped Gaines 
while the trial continued. From time to time they paid 
44 
for his room at the TJMCA. 
He left St. Louis in the spring to speak in Kansas 
City, and from there, he went to find work in Chicago. 
After almost three years of court cases, Gaines tired of 
being the sacrificial lamb. His idealism waned as the 
following letter to his mother indicated: 
I have found that my race still likes to 
applaud, shake hands, pat me on the back, and 
say how great and noble is the idea? how his­
torical and socially important the case, but— 
and there it ends.'" 
43Bluford, "The Lloyd Gaines Story," p. 243. 
44Clayton, "The Strange Disappearance...," pp. 32-33. 
45Ibid., pp. 29-30. This letter was dated March 3, 
1939, and was shown to Clayton by Gaines* mother. 
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A dejected Lloyd Gaines stayed in Chicago for a time, and 
then one night he left his room at the Alpha Phi Alpha 
fraternity house and was never heard from again.46 
The explanations for his disappearance ranged from 
foul play to a financial settlement, but all such reasons 
were based only on rumor. When Charles Houston showed up 
in St. Louis to carry on the court battle in October, 
1939, the NAACP thought they had a client. They soon 
found that Gaines had been missing for some months. A 
panicked search led nowhere. Pictures were carried in 
the nation's newspapers and appeals went out, but the 
NAACP was unable to locate Gaines. Even the Selective 
Service System during World War II was unable to discover 
A*1 
his whereabouts. To this day, Gaines* disappearance 
remains an enigma. 
No sooner had Lloyd Gaines dropped from sight than 
a new crusader took his place. Lucile Bluford began a 
struggle to enter the University of Missouri's School of 
Journalism. Several times, she went in person to the 
46Ibid.. p. 26. 
47Bluford, "The Lloyd Gaines Story," p. 246. 
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Registrar's office only to be told that Lincoln Univer­
sity was responsible for higher education of Negroes in 
Missouri. When the Gaines Case was dropped, the NAACP 
turned to Miss Bluford as the means to crack the door at 
the University of Missouri, and in this sense, the Blu­
ford Case was an extension of the Gaines Case. 
Bluford was brought up in Kansas City, Missouri. She 
attended the University of Kansas and graduated in 1932 
with a degree in journalism. The State of Missouri paid 
part of her tuition during her college years under the 
out-of-state scholarship plan. After working briefly 
for the Atlanta Daily World, she obtained a job with the 
Kansas City Call in 1932. Starting in 1937, Bluford be­
came Managing Editor of that Negro newspaper. Encouraged 
by the Gaines decision and the advice of the NAACP, both 
local and national, she tried to enroll at the University 
43 
of Missouri during the winter of 1938-1939. 
AD 
Bluford vs. Canada. Brief for Appellee at 4, 
9, 20. Prepared by Attorneys Sidney Redmond, Henry Espy, 
John H. David, and Charles Houston for the Supreme Court 
of Missouri, May Term, 1941, #37449. Dorothy Davis, "She 
Knocks at the Door of Missouri University," The Crisis. XLVI 
(May, 1940), 140. 
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The Bluford case again revealed the spirit of co­
operation between the St. Louis branch and the national 
office. The same lawyers who worked on the Gaines Case 
also handled the Bluford suit. There were many reasons 
why the St. Louis branch took the case over the Kansas 
City branch. The St. Louis NAACP was more active, and 
it was in a better financial position. Redmond and Espy 
had the Gaines experience behind them, and they were 
eager to make up for the sad conclusion experienced in 
that case. Houston preferred working with Redmond and 
Espy because of the experience factor. Bluford, who had 
reported the progress of the Gaines Case in the Kansas 
City Call, knew Redmond personally.49 
Even before the Gaines Case was formally closed, the 
NAACP lawyers moved quickly with this new attack. In Oc­
tober, 1939, litigation was started in the state courts, 
and by July, 1940, the case rested before the Missouri 
Supreme Court. The high court decided the state had 
until February, 1941 to establish the necessary courses 
at Lincoln or admit Bluford to the University of Missouri. 
49Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968; 
Espy interview, August 9, 1968. 
50Bluford vs. Canada, 153 S.W. 2d, 17, 18. 
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At the same time Bluford was seeking a writ of man­
damus in the state courts against the University of Mis­
souri, the NAACP lawyers, filed a civil damage suit in 
the federal district court. A civil rights law of 1870 
provided that a person depriving another of rights secured 
by the Constitution could be held liable in the courts for 
redress. Under this law, Bluford sued Registrar Canada 
of the University of Missouri for $10,009. The court 
found that the: "...plaintiff Bluford^/ may not com­
plain that the defendant /_ Canada__/ has deprived her of 
her Constitutional rights until she has appJied to the 
proper authorities for those rights and has been unlaw-
51 
fully refused." The court was indicating that perhaps 
she would have had a case if she were suing the Lincoln 
University Registrar. The federal court proved to be no 
more receptive than the state courts. 
The immediate result for Missouri from the litiga­
tion of both the Gaines and Bluford cases was the estab­
lishment of two new Jim Crow schools. The Lincoln Uni­
versity Law School opened in the fall of 1939 over ths 
51Bluford vs. Canada, 32 Fed. Sup. 711. 
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protest of pickets carrying placards.52 The school was 
located in St. Louis, and it operated until 1943. Some 
of its graduates were admitted to the Bar.53 
Starting in 1941, graduate courses in journalism 
were offered at Lincoln University. The school included 
an attractive building, adequate library, good print 
shop, and an excellent faculty. Teachers from the Uni­
versity of Missouri provided the instruction by driving 
to Jefferson City. By 1945 a Negro faculty was added to 
54 the new school. 
These schools were opened because of the efforts of 
the NAACP, Lloyd Gaines, and Lucile Bluford. Gaines and 
Bluford, however, never attended the schools created for 
their expressed needs. Gaines mysteriously disappeared. 
Bluford felt she had more experience than the new school 
could offer, and her basic motive for her suit was to 
open the University of Missouri. 
52 
Carey McWilliams, "Racial Dialectic: Missouri 
Style," The Nation. CLX (February 24, 1945), 209. 
53Ibid.. pp. 208-209. 
54Ibid.. p. 209. 
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The Bluford suite brought to an end the NAACP's con­
centrated effort to open the professional schools for 
Negroes in Missouri. War diverted interest away from this 
effort. The NAACP had carried on the drive for six years, 
and the finances of the Association would not permit it 
to spend more of its already insufficient funds on the 
55 seemingly impregnable segregation policies of Missouri. 
After World War II, the NAACP decided to attack 
segregated education head-on. It became apparent that 
the states would continue to evade the Gaines mandate by 
setting up segregated schools. Starting in 1947, the 
NAACP devised a program to demolish the entire structure 
of segregated education. 
This new offensive started with state professional 
and graduate schools. All of the cases undermining segre­
gation in higher education depended heavily upon the 
c7 
Gaines decision. By 1949, the NAACP's efforts in 
^Marshall, "An Evaluation of Recent Efforts...", 
p. 318; McMahon, "The Litigation of the National...", 
p. 249. 
56NAACP Annual Report. New York, 1947, pp. 22-23. 
J/Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools, p. 32; Frank 
P. Graham, and Benjamin E. Mays, "Segregation and the 
Schools," Public Affairs Pamphlet, #209, New York: NAACP, 
N.d., p. 9. 
102 
Oklahoma and Texas were successful, for the highest court 
in the land, in effect, over-ruled the "separate but 
CO 
equal" doctrine for professional schools. 
Missouri was moving away from segregated graduate 
education by the late 1940's. In 1949, Missouri's House 
of Representatives passed a bill allowing Negroes to en­
ter the University of Missouri if the courses it offered 
were not available at Lincoln University. This bill was 
blocked in the Senate, however, because of the Fairgrounds 
59 Park Incident and the maneuvering of Senator Edward V. 
60 Long. 
The Board of Curators of the University of Missouri 
hoped this bill would pass, and when it did not, they 
decided to act. One Board member contacted the St. Louis 
NAACP and indicated that the time was right to file an­
other suit. Three black students were selected, and then 
58Jessie P. Guzman, Twenty Years of Court Decisions 
Affecting Higher Education in the South. 1938-1958, (Tus-
kegee Institute Press, June, 1960), pp. 12-13? Albert P. 
Blaustein and Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the 
Law; The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation 
Cases, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
1947), pp. 109-110. 
59See Chapter VII. 
6°Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 324-327. 
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they filed for admittance to the engineering and grad­
uate schools at the University of Missouri. The case was 
taken to Judge Sam C. Blair's Cole County Circuit Court 
because both parties thought Judge Blair more sympathetic 
61 
than the judge serving in Columbia. 
In March, 1950, the University of Missouri asked for 
a judicial determination in the case, in other words, the 
University of Missouri's officials asked that the ruling 
be given in general terms. This type of ruling would do 
away with the need for future suits. Judge Blair did not 
frustrate the consenting sides, for he ruled that Negroes 
could not be excluded from the University of Missouri be­
cause of race if the courses they wanted were not offered 
62 
at Lincoln University. The University of Missouri did 
not appeal the ruling, and in the fall of 1950, the school 
received its first black students. The St. Louis NAACP 
branch bore the financial burdens incurred in this case. 
The branch also financed, in part, the educational 
61 
Espy interview, August 9, I960. 
62 
Sawyer, "The Gaines Case", pp. 327-330. 
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expenses of the three black students during their first 
63 year at the University of Missouri. 
With the admittance of these black students to the 
University of Missouri, the branch achieved in an anti-
climactic fashion the goal first sought in the Gaines Case. 
The success experienced with the Gaines case was due to 
the close cooperation between the NAACP and its branch in 
St. Louis. The national furnished the stimulus, and the 
branch eagerly became active in the new offensive. The 
Gaines decision proved to be the most important contribu­
tion of the St. Louis branch to the advancement of black 
Americans. The decision had towering importance for the 
entire country, for it supplied the legal basis for the 
desegregation of professional and graduate facilities in 
several border and southwestern states after World War II. 
In the long run, the importance of the Gaines Case cannot 
63 
Witherspoon, Interview, August 12, 1968; Letter, 
Henry Espy to St. Louis NAACP, December 21, 1950, St. 
Louis NAACP Branch Piles. This bill was submitted to the 
branch by the Redmond and Espy law firm for services 
amounting to $1520 for the Bell, Horne, and Rigdel vs. 
University of Missouri Case. This bill gives one an idea 
of the expenses encountered by the branch. 
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be limited to higher education. Given hindsight, it is 
easy to conclude that the Gaines Case was the first major 
break in the wall of segregated education. Once each 
state was forced to provide truly "separate but equal" 
schools, it soon became apparent that this was an impos­
sible task. From that point, it was a relatively small 
step for the Supreme Court in 1954 to conclude that segre­
gated education was "inherently unequal." 
CHAPTER VII 
THE POST WAR YEARS: 1945-1955 
Usually the meetings of the St. Louis NAACP were 
held at the Pine Street YMCA. This was not the case for 
the November, 1944, membership meeting, whose chief busi­
ness was to elect the president for the following year. 
Militant members led by Henry Wheeler had changed the 
location for this particular meeting to the Carr Square 
Village Housing Project Meeting Hall. The maneuver was 
designed to make it easier to get their supporters to 
the meeting. The militants elected David Grant presi­
dent for 1945,1 thus ending the six-year term of Sidney 
Redmond. By the spring of 1945, the changeover in 
leadership was completed and the office of the branch 
business secretary was moved adjacent to the law office 
of David Grant.2 
iRedmond Interviews, May 27, 1968; August 13, 1968; 
Grant Interviews, June i, 1968; August 10, 1968. 
^St. Louis Argus, November 10, 1944; April 27, 1945. 
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Grant, like Redmond, was highly articulate, out­
spoken, and energetic. Style and political philosophy 
separated these two men. Redmond was serious in conver­
sation. Grant, on the other hand, was apt to interject 
a humorous or risque illustration to get his point across. 
Redmond was a life-long Republican, while Grant was a mem­
ber of the Democratic party since the 1930's. 
David Grant was a native St. Louisan. He obtained 
his law degree from Howard University. Under Democratic 
dominated city administrations he held the offices of 
Associate City Counselor, Assistant Circuit Attorney, and 
Research Director for the Board of Aldermen, in 1939, he 
was arrested while leading demonstrators who were picket­
ing the Jim Crow Law School in St. Louis established by 
Lincoln University. The year 1942 found Grant actively 
engaged with Theodore D. McNeal, president of the St. 
Louis Sleeping Car Porters Union, in organizing the March 
on Washington in St. Louis. The March on Washington Organ­
ization arranged a demonstration outside the St. Louis 
Small Arms Plant. Following the demonstration, McNeal 
and Grant negotiated with the plant management demanding 
jobs for Negroes. Soon these demands were met by the 
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opening of a separate building which employed Negroes.^ 
Grant was the first Democrat to become president of 
the St. Louis NAACP. During the 1930's, he claimed he 
was not an active member of the NAACP because he was a 
Democrat. It was thought by many St. Louis Negroes as 
late as the 1940's that being a Democrat was the equiva­
lent of being disloyal to one's race. Grant was always 
forced to defend himself at NAACP meetings, and therefore, 
he dropped out as an active member.4 In 1943, he gained 
some distinction by working with Thurgood Marshall in a 
case that equalized the salary for Missouri Negro teachers 
with that of white teachers.^ At this point. Grant's 
popularity began to rise among the middle-class Negroes. 
3 Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968? 
The Booker T. Washington Trading Stamp Association. "Metro­
politan St. Louis: Negro Directory: A Classified Publica­
tion of Biographies," St. Louis, 1943, p. 19. The March 
on Washington was conceived by A. Phillip Randolph of the 
National Sleeping Car Porters Union. It was organized to 
march 10,000 protestors on Washington, D. C. if the Fed­
eral Government would not open defense jobs to Negroes. 
President Roosevelt issued an executive order which mado 
the planned march unnecessary. 
4 Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
5St. Louis Argus. August 20, 1943. 
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It was over the relatively small matter of advice 
given to department store demonstrators that Grant came 
to the forefront as a candidate for the president of the 
branch. As early as 1933, the NAACP local had protested 
the discriminatory practices in the cafeterias of the 
leading department stores. Although not under the spon­
sorship of the NAACP, many members participated in sit-
ins and demonstrations in 1944, which were under the dir-
ection of Theodore McNeal. Representatives of the stores 
threatened the demonstrators with arrest for trespassing. 
Henry Wheeler and some other active NAACP members sought 
the advice of Sidney Redmond. Redmond advised that "there 
was at least a strong liklihood that they would be arrest-
7 ed." Dissatisfied with this advice, Wheeler and his 
group went to David Grant. Grant told Wheeler that as 
long as there was no destruction of property, they would 
probably not be arrested. His opinion was based on the 
\ 
premise that the stores would not act because they feared 
^Ibid.« November 10, 1933; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 
July 9, 1944. 
7Redmond Interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 1968. 
Redmond disapproved of the demonstrators' using children, 
for if they were arrested they would have that mark for 
life. 
110 
adverse publicity. Mayor Kaufmann had recently declared 
Pruitt Day in honor of the World War II Negro Air Force 
pilot from St. Louis. Grant reasoned that the stores 
would not want to bring attention to the fact that they 
were discriminating against the race that had just had 
one of its members honored by the city. This advice 
proved correct, for the demonstrators were not arrested, 
and their efforts were rewarded by some desegregation of 
8 store cafeteria facilities. 
On the strength of the advice given to the militant 
members of the NAACP, Grant was approached about the 
presidency. After Theodore McNeal encouraged him to 
accept this offer. Grant told the group that he would 
Q 
accept the position if elected. Probably one of the 
chief motives for Grant's candidacy was a desire on the 
part of McNeal and Grant to give more prestige to their 
party by obtaining the leadership of the NAACP. Up to 
this time, it had always been held by leading Republicans. 
8 Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968; August 10, 1968. 
g 
Theodore McNeal was on the Executive Board 
the St. Louis NAACP, and he was a leading Negro Demo­
crat and labor union leader. 
Ill 
Whatever the motive, Grant was elected at the housing 
project meeting, and he took office early in 1945. 
The Republican and Democratic parties were stereo­
typed on the issue of economics. Many saw the Democratic 
party as "big spenders" and the Republicans as "misers." 
Grant and Redmond, acted out these exaggerated roles. 
One of the last acts of the Redmond administration was 
to put several thousand dollars of the branch's funds 
into U. S. Government Savings Bonds which could not be 
cashed for a six-month period. This action reflected 
Redmond's fear that the Grant administration would be 
less than thrifty. Grant proved Redmond correct, for 
by the end of 1947, the branch had little in the way of 
surplus funds. Grant believed that the branch needed 
liquidity and not investments. It was his feeling that 
the funds could serve a better purpose by being used in 
the work of the NAACP. Another shift in policy was the 
de-emphasis of volunteer work. Paying people for their 
services was thought by Grant a much better policy than 
the unreliable method of volunteer work.3"3" This new 
10Ibid7 Redmond interviews, May 27, 1968, August 13, 
1968. 
^Grant Interviews, June I, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
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policy, no doubt, cut into the reserve fund accumulated 
during the Redmond years. 
One innovation in the postwar years was the hiring 
of an executive secretary for the St. Louis NAACP. This 
was part of the change sought by Grant of relying more on 
paid workers as opposed to volunteer help. The innovation 
may have solved some problems, but it also created a new 
one. Throughout the postwar era, the branch was forced 
to define the role of the executive secretary. The exe­
cutive secretary found her job difficult because her re­
sponsibility and authority were not clear. It was hard 
to please everyone in the branch because everyone had a 
12 different idea as to what this new position entailed. 
The first executive secretary faced this handicap, and 
in the spring of 1948, the executive board of the branch, 
over the protest of the president, voted to terminate 
her services. Objections to the caliber of her work and 
l^witherspoon Interview, August 12, 1968; Hubert 
L. Brown, Personal interview with author held 4515 Holly 
Pi., St. Louis, Mo., August 14, 1968. 
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the financial condition of the branch were the reasons 
13 
for this action. 
It had become common practice for the branch to ask 
the NAACP for a field worker to organize their membership 
campaigns. Ihe branch was expected to pay for this help. 
instead of following this procedure, the branch decided 
to hire someone from within the branch. Mrs. Stella B. 
Price was hired at $100 per month to conduct the 1949m3m-
14 bership campaign. By the spring of 1949, Mrs. Price 
was ready to resign because she felt "...handicapped by 
an uncooperative attitude of some of the officers and 
15 
members of the board." Some groups felt the paid 
worker was infringing upon their fields of authority. 
In addition to the difficult problem of defining 
the authority of their paid workers, the branch also had 
13 St. Louxs NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive 
Board Meetings, April 17, 1948; May 29, 1948. (Type­
written), St. Louis NAACP Piles. As a protest to this 
action, Mrs. J. Claybourne Bush, the secretary of the 
branch, resigned. 
14 
Ibid., January 9, 1948. 
15Ibid., May 14, 1959; Letter, Stella B. Price, Bus­
iness Secretary of Branch, to President Pettigrew, July 1, 
1949, St. Louis NAACP Files. She asked in this letter to 
be released from her duties because she found it impossible 
to continue. 
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to contend with the possible infiltration of their organ­
ization by subversive groups. It was known that the Com­
munist party had adopted the policy of capturing branches 
16 
in order to exert an influence on the NAACP. During 
the Grant and Ruffin administrations, some attempts were 
made in this direction. The FBI was continually checking 
various individual branch members. Some members worked 
17 as "dupes," ' and some of the leaders of the branch were 
18 approached to take out membership in the Community party. 
All the branch's leaders agreed, however, that a communist 
never gained a position of leadership in the branch and 
some believed it only a "red herring."-'-9 The branch was 
very careful, perhaps to the point of over reaction, in 
the selection of its leaders. For example, in 1950 
Mrs. Valla Abbrington was nominated for the executive 
l®Wilso» Record, The Negro and the Communist Party. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951) 
pp. 147, 182, 265-268. 
17 Grant interviews, June 1, 1969; August 10, 1968. 
Unfortunately specific information on this topic was un­
obtainable. 
laRuffin interview, August 31, 1968. 
•^Brown Interview, August 14, 1968; Witherspoon In­
terview, August 12, 1968. 
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board. It was pointed out that she was an official in 
the Social and Office Workers Union, which had been ex­
pelled by the CIO as subversive. This objection to her 
appointment kept her off the board until the "charges 
20 
were proven unfounded." The leadership of the St. 
Louis NAACP did not want to compound their problems of 
being black by also becoming "Red." 
One of the chief characteristics of the St. Louis 
NAACP during the postwar period was increased factional­
ism and constant internal dissension. Heated disagree­
ments developed before the end of Grant's administration. 
The very group that had elected Grant turned on him after 
he was elected. The militants, led by Henry Wheeler and 
Joseph Clark, continually attacked him at meetings, and 
more than once Grant and these members almost came to 
blows.21 
The national office showed some concern over the 
branch's internal difficulties. The branch voted to 
2c^St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive 
Board Meetings, June 3, 1950; September 11, 1950, (Type­
written), St. Louis NAACP Files. 
21Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968? Grant Inter­
views, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
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accept a worker from the national office because that 
22 
office felt the branch "needed stimulation." The re­
port of the NAACP's worker, Daniel E. Byrd, listed many 
causes for the branch's difficulties, but the conclusion 
pinpointed the chief problem: "I am convinced that segre­
gation can be eliminated in St. Louis if some semblance 
23 of unity is forthcoming from the Negroes." From the 
national office's point of view, the branch had to limit 
its schismatic tendencies before a successful program 
could be achieved. 
The internal splits that developed in the St. Louis 
NAACP in the postwar era were very obvious, but the rea­
sons for this phenomenon were more obscure. In Chapter IV, 
it was pointed out that in the 1920's the St. Louis NAACP 
had similar difficulties. In both periods there was a 
major shift in leadership; in the 1920's from white to 
black and in the mid 1940's from Republican to Democratic. 
The conflict between Republicans and Democrats, at least 
22St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes cf the Executive 
Board Meeting, June 20, 1949. Special meeting, (type­
written) St. Louis NAACP Files. 
23Letter, Daniel E. Byrd, Assistant Field Secretary 
of the National NAACP to the Executive Board of the St. 
Louis NAACP, July 29, 1949, St. Louis NAACP Files. 
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in part, caused some of the internal schisms, indeed, 
the national office found it necessary to set down pre­
cise rules forbidding branches from participating in parti-
O A 
san politics. Another reason for the factionalism was 
the conflicting ideas of militants and conservatives. The 
militants wanted the branch to expand its program to in­
clude many new issues, and they also wanted to use the 
weapon of demonstrations. The more conservative members 
were inclined to focus on one or two primary problems. 
They felt that other organizations were better suited for 
demonstrations, and they wanted to keep the center of their 
25 
attention on the courts. From 1948 through 1953, the 
duration of presidential tenure was one year. Certainly 
the constant change of presidents caused a leadership 
vacuum where strong presidents had previously guided the 
branch. This leadership void encouraged the chairmen of 
24 Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
St. Louis NAACP Branch. The Political Action Committee 
File, August 27, 1946, (typewritten), St. Louis NAACP Files. 
At the 37th annual conference which David Grant attended, 
it was decided to restrict the activities of the branches 
to purely non-partisan politics. This action was unneces­
sary before because the NAACP had been overwhelmingly Re­
publican orientated. 
25Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968. 
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the various committees to promote their particular 
spheres of concern as major projects to be undertaken by 
the entire branch. This competition between committees, 
26 
in turn, furthered the internal bickering. There were 
many causes for the schismatic tendencies, and the lack 
of unity weakened the branch in many ways. 
During the War and immediately afterwards, the NAACP 
had its greatest surge in membership. Following the war 
27 
membership peaked at about half-million mark. In 1949, 
the dues were increased from $1 to $2 per year, and mem­
bership dropped appreciably. The greatest decline in 
membership came in the big cities, and St. Louis was one 
28 of these cities. During the last years of the war and 
the years following, branch membership ranged between 
5,500 and 8,000. From 1949 through 1955, membership 
29 
totaled under 3,000 per year. On the national level, 
28Ibid? Brown Interview, August 14, 1968. 
2?st. James, The National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People, pp. 54, 86-87. 
28NAACP Annual Report, New York, 1949, pp. 65-66. 
Membership for 1949 was put at 248,676. 
29Gloster Current, "Report of the Director of Branches 
to the Missouri State Conferences of Branches," October 2, 
1948, St. Louis NAACP Files? NAACP Annual Report. New York, 
1951, p. 15; St. Louis NAACP Branch, "Annual Report of 
Local Branch of St. Louis," 1961, p. 7. 
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the sharp decline was attributed to lay offs, crop fail­
ures, and the dues increase. In St. Louis, the schismatic 
condition of the branch helped to decrease membership. 
The finances of the branch reflected the drop in mem­
bership. Early in 1949, individuals extended the branch 
gifts and loans totaling almost $1,000 to keep it alive 
until the membership drive was completed in the summer of 
that year.^0 Gloster Current of the national office re­
ported in 1953 that the branch started the year with a 
$13.74 deficit. He also noted that over $1,000 had been 
borrowed from the branch's special fund which was supposed 
31 
to be used only for educational purposes. Along with 
all the other problems facing the branch, financial dif­
ficulties plagued the branch in the postwar years. Des­
pite these obstacles, the branch was able to carry out an 
active program. 
30 
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of General Member­
ship Meeting, January 3, 1949, (typewritten), St. Louis 
NAACP Branch, Disbursement File, June, 1949, St. Louis 
NAACP Filer. 
31 
St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of a Special Exe­
cutive Board Meeting, May 9, 1953, (typewritten), St. 
Louis NAACP Files. At this special meeting, a report of 
Gloster Current revealed that of the $1,000 borrowed, 
$555,82 had not been properly authorized. 
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The branch played a restricted, but important role 
in the historic case of Shelley versus Kraemer. The 
Supreme Court ruled in the Shelley Case that restrictive 
covenants (private agreements among white property owners 
not to sell to Negroes) could not be enforced in the 
courts.32 The ruling eliminated the chief legal means 
by which the Negro population of large urban centers was 
kept confined to a relatively small space. In St. Louis, 
the number of restrictive convenants in St. Louis had in­
creased since the World War I era until the Negro ghetto 
was surrounded. Meanwhile the Negro population of the 
city had swelled so that by 1945, it was bursting at the 
33 seams. 
One day in 1945, Leatha Shelley narrowly missed 
being criminally assaulted on her way home from school. 
The Shelley family set out to get away from such things 
by buying a house on the 4600 block of Labadie Avenue, 
34 
because this neighborhood "looked decent." Within two 
32Shelley vs. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1. 
33Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People vs. 
Property; Race Restrictive Covenants, (Nashville, Tennes­
see: Fisk University Press, 1947), pp. 13, 36. 
34st. Louis Star Times, May 4, 1948. 
121 
weeks after moving into their new house, the Shelleys 
were served with a court summons. They had moved into 
a house that was covered by a neighborhood restrictive 
covenant. The Shelleys immediately contacted Robert 
35 Bishop, the realtor who handled the sale of the house. 
Bishop was a member of the Real Estate Brokers' Associa­
tion which, was composed solely of Negro realtors. This 
36 association hired George L. Vaughn to represent the 
Shelleys in court. Vaughn won his case in the circuit 
court, but the decision was reversed by the Missouri 
37 Supreme Court December 9, 1946. 
The NAACP was also engaged with the restrictive cov­
enant issue. The National held a conference July, 1945, 
in Chicago for the purpose of educating and coordinating 
those involved with pertinent cases throughout the country. 
George Vaughn and David Grant attended the Chicago con-
38 
ference. Even at this early stage, the NAACP attempted 
35Vose, Caucasians Only, pp. 109-111. Bishop was the 
minister of the church which the Shelleys attended. He 
bought the house from a straw party for $4,700 and sold it 
to the Shelleys for $5,700. 
38This was the same George Vaughn who had served im­
mediately following World War I as Chairman of the Execu­
tive Board of the branch NAACP. See Chapter IV. 
37Vose, Caucasians Only, pp. 116-119. 
38Ibid.. pp. 57-59, 61-64, 105. 
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to select the best possible case to place before the 
Supreme Court. The NAACP was not allowed to select be­
cause Vaughn unilateraly filed the Shelley case before 
the Supreme Court in April, 1947. This forced the NAACP 
39 to file its cases before all was ready for such a move. 
Such was the situation when the St. Louis NAACP re­
ceived a letter requesting financial help for the Shelley 
case. The letter was from the Real Estate Brokers' Asso­
ciation, and it pointed out that $2,000 had already been 
spent getting the case before the Supreme Court.40 The 
letter was forwarded to the national office with the addi­
tional information that the branch in St. Louis was in no 
position to give financial assistance.41 The national 
office saw in this financial request a lever with which 
to bring the Shelley case more directly under their super­
vision. They felt Vaughn was "lacking proper sophistica­
tion and skill to handle the intricate legal complexities 
39Ibid., p. 157. 
40Letter, Charles T. Bush to St. Louis NAACP, July 11, 
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files. 
41 Letter, David M. Grant to Thurgood Marshall, 
July 30, 1947, St. Louis NAACP Files. 
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of the problem.1,42 The NAACP held a conference in Sept­
ember, 1947, in New York City to solve the problems fac­
ing t. e lawyers whose cases were pending before the sup­
reme Court. George Vaughn and James T. Bush, the Presi-
43 dent of the Real Estate Brokers* Association, attended. 
Soon after this conference, it became clear that all the 
problems separating Vaughn and the NAACP were not solved. 
The NAACP offered $1,000 to the Brokers' Association on 
the condition that Vaughn would work closely with the 
NAACP lawyers. The brokers rejected the offer because 
they interpreted it to mean that Vaughn was to step aside 
44 as the principal attorney in the Shelley case. 
During the month of September, 1947, the St. Louis 
NAACP attempted to provide the financial help needed for 
the Shelley case. On September 22, the branch asked 
permission of the national office to allow a mass meeting 
42 Clement E. Vose, "NAACP Strategy in the Covenant 
Case," Western Reserve Law Review, VI, Winter, 1955, 129. 
43Vose, Caucasians Only, pp. 160-161. 
44Letters, Thurgood Marshall to David Grant, August 1, 
1947, September 23, 1947. Letters, Charles T. Bush to 
Thurgood Marshall, September 9, 1947, September 29, 1947. 
St. Louis NAACP Files. 
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45 for raising money. This permission was forthcoming in 
the same letter from Thurgood Marshall that withdrew the 
A C  
$1,000 pledge to the Brokers' Association. Even before 
the permission was granted, a citizens' committee was 
formed and efforts were under way to raise the estimated 
$6,000 or $7,000 needed to successfully complete the de-
47 fense of the Shelley family. 
While it was true that the NAACP did not formally 
sponsor the Shelley case, George Vaughn and tha Brokers' 
Association did benefit from its efforts. Vaughn atten­
ded several conferences sponsored by the NAACP and no 
doubt he profited, at least to some degree, from conver­
sations with lawyers handling similar cases. Even with 
all the bickering between the NAACP and the Brokers' 
Association and the resulting lack of coordination, the 
organization of the attackers upon restrictive covenants 
45Letters, Ruth W. Williams, St. Louis NAACP Branch 
Executive Secretary, to Gloster Current, September 22, 
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files. 
46Letter, Thurgood Marshall to David Grant, October 3, 
1947, St. Louis NAACP Files. 
47 ^'Letter, Herman Dreer, Chairman of the Citizens Com­
mittee addressed to "Dear Friend," October 1, 1947, (mime­
ographed), St. Louis NAACP Files. This letter was printed 
on the stationery of the Brokers' Association of St. Louis. 
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proved superior to the organization of the defenders of 
the restrictions. This, in large measure, proved the mar­
gin of victory.48 
In St. Louis, Vaughn and the brokers received strong 
support from the local NAACP. Indeed, it was hard to dis­
tinguish between the brokers, the citizens' committee, and 
the NAACP leadership because of the overlapping member-
49 ships. without the indirect support of the national 
office and the enthusiastic backing of the branch, one 
can speculate that the outcome of the Shelley case might 
have been different. While the NAACP deserved and claimed 
50 no formal recognition for this particular case, to 
neglect its role would be the same as disregarding an im­
portant part of the story. 
49Vose, Caucasians Only, pp. 251-252. 
49Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968; Herman Dreer, 
"Negro Leadership in St. Louis: A Study in Race Relations," 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 
1955), pp. 154-156. The Citizens Committee was largely 
composed of the Executive Board of the St. Louis NAACP 
and some Brokers' Association members. 
50NAACP Annual Report. New York, 1948, pp. 27-28. 
The NAACP claimed credit for the other cases which were 
ruled on by the Supreme Court at the same time as the 
Shelley case, but specifically stated that the Shelley 
case was not under its direction. 
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After World War II, the branch again became involved 
with the problem of segregated education. When David 
Grant took the rains of the St. Louis NAACP, he initiated 
an attack on the segregation policies of Washington Uni­
versity of St. Louis. Washington University had not ad­
mitted Negroes as students since the turn of the century. 
In the spring of 1945, a group sponsored by the NAACP 
attempted to enroll at the school, but they were informed 
51 that the school did not admit Negroes. Much of the 
money that went to support Washington University was in 
the form of receipts from millions of dollars worth of 
tax free property in St. Louis. From time to time, the 
City of St. Louis would take the school to court in order 
to collect the taxes on this property. In an attempt to 
put more pressure on Washington University, in 1945 the 
branch started filing a friend of the court brief in 
connection with the city's suit against the school. This 
5ISt. Louis Arcms. May 18, 1945; June 22, 1945. 
David Grant was quoted as saying the school's policy was 
"immoral and dishonest" because Negroes were barred, but 
forced to contribute in an indirect way by increased 
taxes necessitated by Washington University's tax-free 
property holdings in the city. 
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52 method failed in the courts, but pressure, bad publicity, 
and changing attitudes caused an alteration inthe admis­
sion policies. In 1947, some of the graduate and profes­
sional schools were opened to Negroes, and by 1952 all 
divisions admitted Negroes. 
In 1943, the local NAACP attempted to get students 
to apply to Hadley Technical School and Harris Teachers 
College. Both schools were administrated by the St. Louis 
Board of Education. The catholic schools of St. Louis had 
desegregated, and it seemed right that the public schools 
should follow suit. 
St. Louis supported two teachers colleges; Stowe for 
blacks and Harris for whites. Marjorie V. Toliver attend­
ed Stowe Teachers College. In 1949, she attempted to 
enter Harris Teachers College because Stowe did not offer 
all the courses she wanted and because Stowe was not an 
accredited school. The State Circuit Court found in her 
^Grant Interviews, June 1, 1968; August 10, 1968; 
John J. Kessler, "The St. Louis Public Schools: A Survey 
of Race inequalities," (mimeographed), 1950, p. 65. St. 
Louis NAACP Files. 
53 
St. Louis Bicentennial Corp., "Negroes—Their Gift 
to St. Louis," 1964, p. 8; William D. Hammack, "The Admis­
sion of Negroes to Washington University," Phvlon, (Decem­
ber, 1949), 415-416. 
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favor. By the time the case got to the Missouri Supreme 
Court, however, Stowe had been accredited. The Missouri 
Supreme Court found the two schools "substantially equal" 
54 
and reversed the ruling of the lower court. 
In another case initiated by the branch, Wesley H. 
Brewton and Wilbert R. Brewton applied for entrance into 
the previously all white Hadley Technical High School. 
They attended Washington Technical High School for Negro 
students. The Hadley School included in its curriculum 
an aeromechanics course which was not included at Washing­
ton Technical. In November, 1949, the circuit court 
ordered the board of education to admit the Brewton bro­
thers. ̂5 The case was taken to the Supreme Court of Mis­
souri, but before the court could decide the matter, the 
aeromechanics course was dropped from the curriculum at 
Hadley. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Brewton 
brothers, but pointed out that the case was "moot" and 
should be dismissed because the course in question had 
^4Toliver vs. Board of Education of St. Louis, 230 
S.W. 2d, 726. 
5~'St. Louis Post-Dispatch. November 30, 1949. 
129 
56 been abolished. "The St. Louis Post-Dispatch summed up 
the disheartened feeling of the Negro community with the 
caption "Victory Without Gain.1,57 
The frustration of trying to open the St. Louis public 
schools turned into elation when the branch succeeded in 
desegregating the St. Louis open air public swimming pools. 
By 1949, Negroes had moved into the Fairgrounds Park area. 
Fairgrounds Park included an open air swimming pool, but 
no city-owned open air pool was open to Negroes. The 
branch decided to open the Fairgrounds Park pool. Henry 
Wheeler led several Negroes to the pool, but they were 
turned away. The NAACP asked John J. 0'Toole, Director 
of Public Welfare, for a ruling.58 0'Toole issued an 
order forbidding discriminatory practices at any city-
eg 
owned pool. llie very next day, a near riot took place 
at Fairgrounds park as Negroes attempted to swim in the 
pool. It was not until 400 policemen had been rushed to 
the area that the thousands of whites and blacks were 
55St. Louis Star Times. November 14, 1950. 
57 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. November 15, 1950. 
58Witherspoon Interview, August 12, 1968; Grant Inter­
views, June 1, 1968, August 10, 1968. 
59St. Louis Post-Dispatch. June 21, 1949. 
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placed under control. A total of nine people were hurt in 
various fights during the day.®0 Mayor Darst promptly re­
scinded O'Toole's order desegregating the pools, and the 
branch took the matter to court. 
The branch selected the Federal Court to test the 
issue. Many of the city's high officials were sympathetic 
with the NAACP's goal, but they were afraid of an angry 
reaction from the city's white majority. The officials 
looked forward to the court's favorable decision as an 
excuse to justify opening the pools. 
In the absence of city or state statutes prohibiting 
integration of open air pools, the court found in favor 
of the plaintiffs, Attorney George W. Draper and Rose E. 
Taylor the business secretary of the branch. The NAACP 
lawyers Henry Espy, Sidney Redmond, and Robert Witherspoon 
presented the case in behalf of the plaintiffs. The court 
61 
ordered the city to open its open air pools, and by the 
summer of 1950, Negroes in St. Louis enjoyed swimming pri­
vileges at Fairgrounds park. 
6QIbid.. June 22, 1949. 
®•'•Draper and Taylor vs. City of St. Louis, 92 Fed 
Supp. 546. 
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Court cases were not the only activity of the St, 
Louis NAACP during the years following World War II. in­
creasingly, many branch members were resorting to more 
direct means of bringing about change. One method was 
picketing. A group led by Henry Wheeler continually 
picketed the American Theatre from 1944 to 1953. Letters 
were also sent to actors, playwrights, and the Actors 
Equity Association in order to apply more pressure to have 
62 the American Theatre stop its segregated seating policy. 
Finally in 1953, the year Wheeler became president of the 
branch, the theatre discontinued its discriminatory seat­
ing policy.®3 
Among its other activities in 1948, the local NAACP 
attempted to defeat a bond issue and to have the first 
Negro in the city's history placed on the school board. 
The branch was successful in helping to defeat the bond 
issue for slum clearance. The branch opposed it because 
no provisions were made for the people displaced by the 
proposed clearance. Also the NAACP wanted guaranteed 
®2St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the General 
Membership Meetings, January 5, 1948, (typewritten), St. 
Louis NAACP Files. 
63Ibld., January 5, 1953; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 
January 2, 1953. The theatre was also torn down that year. 
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low-cost housing and fair treatment of Negroes in the 
area after it was rebuilt.**4 
The local NAACP was not successful in securing a 
Negro member on the school board. It was the Mayor's job 
to fill vacancies which occurred because of death or re­
signation. When a vacancy developed in 1948, Mayor Kauf-
mann proved unresponsive to written and oral appeals cal­
ling for a Negro appointment. The NAACP, led by the Presi 
dent, Guy Ruffin, picketed City Hall. This effort brought 
the desired publicity, but not the appointment of a Negro 
to the post.65 
The subject of jobs for Negroes gained more impor­
tance following World War II. During Guy Ruffin*s admin­
istration, the branch made an unsuccessful effort to dis­
continue the Public Service Company's policy of hiring 
66 
only white bus drivers. This attempt followed the pat­
tern set by previous administrations of concentrating only 
64 David Grant, Transcript of speech given on KWK 
radio October 24, 1948? St. Louis NAACP Files? St. Louis 
Argus, October 29, 1948. 
65Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968? St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, August 12, 1948. 
66St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive 
Board Meetings, February 10, 1948, St. Louis NAACP Files? 
Ruffin Interview, August 31, 1968. 
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on government or public service employment. By the mid-
1950' s, under the direction of President Herbert Brown, 
the branch widened its approach to include private indus­
try. But here too the efforts of the NAACP were largely 
unsuccessful.67 
A good case can be made for the claim that the St. 
Louis NAACP could have accomplished much more during the 
postwar era if it had been more united. A case in point 
t 
was the general desegregation of the St. Louis public 
schools. In 1950, the branch started making plans for a 
68 test case. Much of the work of getting the case ready 
for presentation was done by the Education Committee, 
chairmaned by Mrs. A. N. Vaughn. One particular member, 
Herbert Brown, who also served as the Sumner High School 
P.T.A. president, spent much time researching the records 
of the Board of Education. The research led Brown and the 
37Brown Interview, August 14, 1968. Attempts were 
made to have Negroes hired at Kroger Stores and South­
western Bell Telephone Company. The people negotiated 
which usually indicated they were sympathetic, but either 
their boss or the people in the plant were opposed, and 
their hands were therefore tied. 
63St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the Executive 
Board Meetings, June 3, 1950. Minutes of the General 
Membership Meetings, November 4, 1950, St. Louis NAACP 
Files. 
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Education Committee to the conclusion that such a case 
69 
could be started in 1952. Two important NAACP lawyers, 
David Grant and Sidney Redmond, disagreed. The disagree­
ment burst forth at a general membership meeting with the 
net result that Sidney Redmond resigned from his capacity 
as attorney in the proposed education suit, and the fol­
lowing spring David Grant was asked to withdraw from the 
70 case. According to Herbert Brown, if some semblance 
of unity had been worked out, and if the lawyers had not 
been so "lackadaisical," the St. Louis NAACP could well 
have had its case before the Supreme Court instead of 
71 Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka. 
By 1954, there was a general "internal awakening" 
that the dissension hindered the effectiveness of the 
branch. Herbert Brown was approached by five different 
^9Brown Interview, August 14, 1968. 
''^Letter, Harvey Parham to Sidney Redmond, Novem­
ber 15, 1952, St. Louis NAACP Branch, Minutes of the 
Executive Board Meetings, April 4, 1953, St. Louis NAACP 
Piles. 
71 Brown interview, August 31, 1968. 
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factions and asked if he would serve as president. He 
was elected as the fusion candidate and became the first 
president to serve more than a year since the David Grant 
Administration. The branch began to solidify under 
Brown's guidance, and by the end of his term, the branch 
showed signs of becoming a more unified force. 
CONCLUSION 
The NAACP's goal has always been the elimination of 
discriminatory barriers placed before the black minority. 
The St. Louis branch frequently played a major role in 
campaigns started by the national headquarters. During 
the World War I era as the Association argued its case 
• 
against the Louisville Segregation Ordianaee before the 
Supreme Court, the branch fought a similar St. Louis law. 
The national and the branch were eventually successful in 
their respective battles, but segregated neighborhoods 
were kept intact by the use of restrictive covenants. A 
generation later, restrictive covenants were declared un­
enforceable by the Supreme Court, thus destroying the 
legal basis for segregated housing. The NAACP sponsored 
most of the restrictive covenant cases, and the branch 
assisted a local group in bringing the historic Shelley 
vs. Kraeraer Case to a successful conclusion. 
Blacks were often the victims of mob action during 
the first thirty years of this century. The NAACP sought 
to raise public indignation toward lynchers, and, later, 
136 
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demands were made for laws to punish mobs. After the 
East St. Louis riots of 1917, the NAACP made unsuccess­
ful efforts to have the Missouri and Federal governments 
enact anti-lynch laws. Nevertheless, the Association suc­
ceeded in changing the public's attitude, for by the late 
1930's hardly any leader in the country justified mob 
action. The struggle against lynching illustrates how 
some of the NAACP's objectives were achieved only after 
many years of frustration and disappointment. 
The Gaines Case was the branch's most important con­
tribution to the advancement of black Americans. By win­
ning this Supreme Court case, the NAACP took the first big 
step towards breaking the tradition of segregated educa­
tion. The decision made it clear that equal educational 
facilities would have to be provided Negroes within each 
state. After World War II, the NAACP pressed its advant­
age and made the point that the states could not or would 
not provide equal education. In 1954, the Supreme Court 
agreed and reversed its "separate, but equal" ruling of 
the 19th century, declaring that segregated education was 
"inherently unequal." The branch's sponsorship of the 
Gaines Case assured it a place of distinction in any 
study of the American Negro. 
138 
The branch used a variety of methods to achieve its 
goals. Favorite techniques included lobbying and consul­
tation with the power structure. These methods worked 
when branch leaders obtained the appointment of Missouri's 
first Negro to West Point. Although the branch never 
claimed control of the St. Louis Negro vote, it did on 
occasion threaten city officials with that vote. The 
branch opposed several bond issues to force concessions 
from city authorities on issues which the branch felt 
crucial to the black community, rv bring discriminatory 
practices to the public's attention and to advertise its 
work, the branch always encouraged publicity. In 1945, 
the branch started using a new publicity tactic—demon­
strations. The tactic was effective at department store 
cafeterias and at the American Theatre. Litigation was 
the most reliable method used by the branch. Aside from 
its involvement in the Gaines and Shelley cases, the 
branch was active in many lesser known snits. Some were 
successful, such as the Draper Case which opened the out­
door swimming pools of St. Louis to Negroes and the suit 
against the University of Missouri in 1950 which unlocked 
the University doors to black students. Other court cases 
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did not provide immediate victories, but in every in­
stance the desired change eventually developed. 
Certain branch characteristics were found in every 
period. Branch activities were usually the result of 
outside stimulation. The national office gave the dir­
ection and support needed by the branch for its major 
undertakings, and most of the branch presidents were not 
native St. Louisans. The Gaines Case provides the best 
illustration of this theme. The national office furnished 
the basic plan, organization, and legal aid. The two 
branch leaders who handled the case had lived in St. 
Louis for less than eight years. 
Disunity was another branch trait. Disagreements 
over goals and tactics often led to cleavages among mem­
bers. At times, divisions were so intense they hindered 
the effectiveness of the branch. After World War II the 
branch was especially racked with internal dissension and 
suffered for it. , 
Branch leadership has undergone considerable change 
since 1914, At first prominent whites were sought for 
the office of president. They served usefully during 
the first ten years and added prestige to the Association. 
Most of the work, however, was done by the black chairman 
140 
of the executive board. After a black man assumed the 
presidency that office became the most important in the 
branch. Lawyers held office from 1934 to 1948, and liti­
gation increased greatly during those years. Until 1945, 
the president had always been a Republican with a profes­
sional background. The year 1945 not only started the 
Democratic party ascendancy in the branch, which reflect­
ed a change in the voting habits of the black St. Louisan, 
but also witnessed a marked change in the character of 
the rank and file. Previously most of the members were 
of the middle or upper middle class. Membership status 
had shifted downward as the Association widened its base. 
The change was mirrored with a nev? type of branch presi­
dent. Many presidents after 1945 were Democrats holding 
non-professional or semi-professional occupations. 
Changes in leadership types and membership status 
were not the only alterations which took place during 
the branch's history. The NAACP has proved itself a 
flexible organization as tactics were frequently changed, 
and as one goal was reached new ones were pursued. The 
basic objective of the NAACP, the attainment of first-
class citizenship for blacks, has always been the same. 
A good deal of progress has been made in obtaining this 
141 
objective, and the St. Louis NAACP played a conspicuous 
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